A confrontation that began with an incident at the Agriculture Directorate soon spiralled into a test of Iraq’s balance of weapons and political influence—an arena where local rivalries intersect with regional calculations. All of this unfolded just months before the November 2025 elections through which Prime Minister Muhammad Al-Sudani seeks to secure a second term.

The confrontation inside Iraq’s ‘Shi‘a house’ escalated sharply in recent weeks. The spark came on 27 July, when gunmen stormed the Agriculture Directorate in Baghdad’s Karkh district after the replacement of its director. The raid escalated into a clash with federal police, leaving dead and wounded and resulting in arrests. 

On 9 August, Prime Minister Muhammad Al-Sudani endorsed the findings of an investigative committee that attributed the raid to members of Kata’ib Hezbolla, serving in brigades 45 and 46 of the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF).  

The report confirmed that the force had acted outside official orders. The government responded by dismissing the brigade commanders, referring those involved to the judiciary, and opening an inquiry into command and control within the PMF. 

This marked an unprecedented approach to Iraq’s armed factions, signalling Sudani’s willingness to test the limits of their influence. Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the largest groups and among the closest to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, became the test case. 

The Agriculture Directorate raid: spark of the crisis 

Kata’ib Hezbollah responded in two waves. On 4 August, it issued a statement describing the incident as a “trap”, accusing state agencies and “foreign actors” of involvement, and questioning Sudani’s military credentials. A second statement followed on 10 August, accusing the government of “fabricating investigations” and demanding a “neutral” committee under the supervision of the Coordination Framework. 

The tone made clear that Kata’ib Hezbollah did not see the affair as a simple disciplinary matter. Instead, it was a struggle to redraw the balance of power in Baghdad and its ‘belt’—the agricultural lands surrounding the capital. The group had turned these state-owned lands into lucrative commercial projects after parcelling them into residential plots. 

Even so, the Coordination Framework, the umbrella for Shi‘a parties, refrained from intervening between Sudani and Kata’ib Hezbollah. 

Sudani’s gamble: weapons under state control 

Sudani, for his part, stressed the principle that “no weapons lie outside state institutions”, while insisting that his measures targeted no single faction. Yet the timing and scope of the decisions put his office in direct confrontation with a group that saw itself as part of the deterrent to US influence in the region, rooted in a long history of mobilisation since 2003. 

The complexity lies in Kata’ib Hezbollah’s dual identity: legally part of the PMF since 2016, but in practice retaining independent decision-making, political arms, and economic networks. 

“The conflict between the two sides has been simmering for months, though it only recently surfaced”, a political source said. “The confrontation at the Agriculture Directorate was Sudani’s way of showing strength against Kata’ib Hezbollah, while they had long feared a direct clash”. The source added: “Kata’ib Hezbollah are betting on time… betting on removing Sudani from the premiership”. 

Sudani, by contrast, dreams of seeing Kata’ib Hezbollah lay down its arms like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party did. The source commented: “It is a distant dream, one we will never see in Iraq, but it is a dream that allows Sudani to pressure Kata’ib Hezbollah on two fronts: to draw closer to Washington, and to set new limits on his relationship with Iran”. 

US warnings over Iraq’s PMF law 

The clash unfolded against the backdrop of a legislative battle over a new PMF law. Washington made clear, through Iraqi intermediaries and media, that it opposed any provision that would shield the factions as a parallel armed force. 

On 13 August, Senator James Risch, chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned against integrating “Iranian-backed armed groups” into the Iraqi army without disarmament. He described such a move as a “back door” for Iran to undermine Iraq’s sovereignty, urging Baghdad to choose between “falling back towards Iran or opening up to the West”. 

Think tanks in Washington echoed the warning, raising the possibility of sanctions and a recalibration of the US–Iraq partnership. Under this pressure, parliament delayed passage of the law in recent weeks. 

Meanwhile, Najaf reasserted itself. In July, Sheikh Abdul Mahdi al-Karbala’i, representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, delivered the clearest message since the 2019 protests, calling openly for weapons to be confined to the state, for stronger institutions, and for the fight against corruption. 

Political and security actors interpreted the speech as a moral mandate for restoring the balance of power to the state, with all that implied for reining in the factions beyond traditional operations. 

Iran steps in as elections approach 

Tehran also moved. On 11–12 August, Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited Baghdad and signed a classified security memorandum. The timing was significant: Iraq’s position towards Iran had wavered since the 12-day war between Tehran and Tel Aviv. 

“There is a tendency to misread Iraq’s political scene without acknowledging the changes since those days of mutual bombardment between Israel and Iran”, said a political adviser to a force close to Sudani. “The mood today is one of waiting—watching to see what comes of US threats of sanctions, and what becomes of the confrontation between Iran and the United States, whether it ends in negotiations or in war”. 

Larijani’s visit carried a dual message: reassurance to allies inside Iraq, and a reminder to Baghdad that disarmament or integration must take account of the broader regional struggle—a struggle requiring time that Iraq may not have under mounting sanction threats. 

Iraq’s fragile balance before the November 2025 elections 

According to PMF sources, Kata’ib Hezbollah is betting on the approaching Iraqi elections scheduled for 11 November 2025, and on the possibility that Sudani would not win renewal—leaving space for a new prime minister more amenable to negotiating a survival formula under less confrontational terms. 

This divergence in bets reveals that both sides are calculating their moves with the elections in mind, not just the immediate confrontation. 

Sudani faces a delicate equation. Any further escalation against Kata’ib Hezbollah risks fracturing the Coordination Framework and alienating factions such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, who might fear being next. Yet any retreat would undermine the narrative of ‘state authority’ he had built over the past two years, weakening his position with Washington and with regional partners. 

His disciplinary measures against the commanders of brigades 45 and 46 suggest that he had chosen to test the limits. 

Kata’ib Hezbollah, meanwhile, recognises that an open confrontation would bring financial, legal, and security costs it is not willing to bear—especially under growing US threats to use economic and legal tools if parliament entrenches the PMF as a parallel force. 

The group’s statements therefore blended sharp political rhetoric—talk of “traps” and “fabrication”—with calls for ‘neutral’ committees and internal negotiations, a strategy designed to preserve bargaining power over weapons, deployments, and local economic interests. 

Fault lines redrawn 

The events of late July and early August redrew Iraq’s fault lines: Najaf pushing the principle of arms under state authority as the measure of legitimacy; the government testing its tools inside the PMF; Washington pressing through law and sanctions; and Tehran working to contain losses and prevent the forced dismantling of factions. 

This raises a question no one in the Green Zone could answer: would Iraq turn the crisis into an opportunity to redefine state–arms relations before the 11 November elections, or slide into temporary bargains that delay, rather than resolve, the inevitable explosion? 

“Everyone knows Iran has grown weaker”, the political adviser said. “The political class is trying to act cautiously… not following it blindly to the point of angering the United States and not distancing themselves to the point of leaving Iran feeling abandoned”. 

He added: “Iran’s weakness shows in its inability to bring the Shi‘a factions to one table. But its failure to unite them does not mean it has lost influence”. 

This fragile balance extends to Iran’s relationship with Sudani. “Although Kata’ib Hezbollah describe Sudani as the prime minister closest to Washington—and remember, this is a faction close to the Revolutionary Guard—Iranian officials and even the Guard itself maintain good relations with him”, the adviser said. 

He concluded that the relationship might yet reach a moment where Iran decides to “grant Sudani a second term”, if doing so serves its interests amid ongoing regional shifts.