"Pack your bags. The striking force is on its way!" Faiq Al-Sheikh’s smile amid the regional inferno 

Yahia Issam

15 May 2025

Nearly three years ago, former Iraqi MP, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali, promised the arrival of a striking force that would overthrow Iraq’s political system. Since then, developments on the ground have given that claim a new resonance.

On 27 May 2022, Al-Sheikh Ali posted on X (formerly Twitter), warning that the leaders of Iraq’s armed factions would suffer “fatal setbacks” in 2024, a prophecy that no longer feels entirely out of step with reality.  

At the time, the region was relatively quiet. There were no major escalations to justify such a prediction. Only a handful of minor-impact rocket and drone attacks were taking place, mostly targeting American interests at Ain Al-Asad base in Anbar and the Harir base in Erbil. 

These attacks were claimed by groups with unfamiliar names. But it is believed that the groups consisted of militants affiliated with prominent Shiite factions who preferred not to claim responsibility openly to dodge direct accountability. 

This pattern wasn’t new. It had emerged after the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and escalated further following the US assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis in Baghdad on 3 January 2020. 

Three days before Al-Sheikh Ali’s post, a drone attack targeted Victoria Base, which hosts US forces inside Baghdad Airport. At the time, Iran was deep in negotiations to revive the nuclear deal, while Iraq remained stuck in a political deadlock following the October 2021 parliamentary elections.  

Western analyses argued that Iran was leveraging its armed allies in Iraq to pressure Washington—both in the stalled nuclear talks and in shaping Baghdad’s post-election power dynamics. 

Muqtada Al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist movement, pushed to form what he called a “national majority government”, one that sidelined Shiite factions aligned with Iran. 

Al-Sadr’s bloc secured 73 seats in the 2021 election. He moved quickly to build an alliance with Al-Taqaddum Coalition, led by Sunni politicians Khamis Al-Khanjar and Muhammad Al-Halbousi, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani. The alliance came to be known as the Tripartite Alliance. 

Opposing them was the Coordination Framework, a bloc of Iran-aligned Shiite parties determined to block Sadr’s attempt at reshaping Iraq’s political balance. What followed was a bitter deadlock between the two camps over who would form the next government. 

A meeting of the Tripartite Alliance at Muqtada Al-Sadr’s residence. Source: Sadrist Movement Media. 

The Tripartite Alliance failed, time and time again, to secure the quorum needed to elect a president, a constitutional step required before forming a new government. Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework effectively blocked each attempt, using what came to be known as the “disruptive third” tactic. Despite the deadlock, Muhammad Al-Halbousi was re-elected Speaker of Parliament in January 2022. Alongside him, Hakim Al-Zamili—a senior Sadrist figure—was named First Deputy Speaker, while Shakhawan Abdullah of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) took the role of Second Deputy Speaker.  

 Al-Zamili tightened his grip on parliamentary proceedings with this arrangement, while Al-Halbousi remained largely symbolic. 

As disputes over government formation deepened — and with parliament under Sadrist influence — a draft law to criminalise normalisation of ties with Israel was tabled for its first reading on the agenda on 11 May 2022. 

Just four days later, on 15 May, Muqtada Al-Sadr announced his temporary withdrawal from formation efforts, declaring a shift to “national opposition” for at least 30 days. 

By 26 May, parliament had passed the law banning normalisation with Israel. Then, 17 days later, on 12 June, Al-Sadr called on his 73 MPs to resign from parliament. Speaker Muhammad Al-Halbousi accepted the resignations without delay. 

Notably, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali’s cryptic post came just one day after the anti-normalisation law was passed. 

The final deadline 

Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali stayed silent about his post until a televised interview with journalist Sahar Abbas on 5 July 2022. There he declared: 

“2024 is the latest deadline for toppling and eliminating the current regime forever. It doesn’t matter if it happens a month earlier or later.” 

He spoke of an international force, “massive, decisive, destructive, and merciless”, that would bring about the regime’s collapse. 

Throughout the interview, Al-Sheikh Ali painted a graphic picture of Iraq’s rebirth: a respected state rising after the heads of the current political structure were killed, jailed, or executed. 

When asked about Muqtada Al-Sadr, he said there were two scenarios. Either Al-Sadr would meet the same fate as others. Or he would be allowed to leave Iraq before the operation began. 

Amer Al-Fayez, head of the Tasmem Alliance and a key figure of the Coordination Framework, told Jummar that the Framework dismissed the remarks outright. “The Framework doesn’t convene to discuss attention-seeking statements, whether from Al-Sheikh Ali or anyone else.” 

He insisted that any change in Iraq must come from the people, through elections alone. 

Just 25 days later, on 30 July 2022, Al-Sadr reappeared. He sent his supporters into Baghdad’s streets. They stormed the parliament building in the Green Zone and began an open-ended sit-in. 

The Coordination Framework responded on the same day, mobilising its own supporters elsewhere in the Green Zone. The power struggle had spilled into the streets. By then, parliament was under the Framework’s control, following the mass resignation of Sadrist MPs. Talks were underway to elect a new president and form a government. 

Many observers saw Al-Sadr’s move as an attempt to return, either out of regret or defiance.  

Photos of his followers roaming the halls of parliament spread rapidly. On the fourth day, he ordered to withdraw to the parliament. On the fifth, he demanded the dissolution of the parliament and early elections, threatening to maintain the sit-in unless his call was answered. The Coordination Framework rejected the request.  

The deadlock persisted until 29 August 2022. 

That morning, Al-Sadr announced his final and complete withdrawal from politics. His armed followers stormed the Green Zone. Clashes erupted between the Sadrist and unidentified forces. Some said they were Iranian fighters. Others blamed faction members, Green Zone security, or a mix of all three.   

An army officer told Jummar the military had been ordered to stand down. 

The clashes lasted from Monday into midday Tuesday, leaving casualties behind and prompting a nationwide curfew. Many Iraqis felt the absurdity had reached its peak. Quietly some hoped that Al-Sheikh Ali’s prediction might come to pass. 

Supporters of the Sadrist movement storm the Green Zone. Source: Social Media. 

Al-Sadr appeared in a televised address on Tuesday afternoon. In an attempt to display anger, he declared:  

“The killer and the killed are both in hell. What a wretched revolution this is.” 

He sought to distance himself from the violence, ordering his followers to withdraw within 60 minutes and end the sit-in around parliament. 

Reuters and other media outlets reported that the speech came after a sharply worded message from Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani’s office in Najaf.  

The Sadrists complied. Live broadcasts showed them retreating from the Green Zone, armed and in full view of army and police forces, who did not intervene. The curfew was lifted. Calm returned. Al-Sadr stepped back from the spotlight.  

The beginning of the earthquakes 

The Coordination Framework came out on top. On 13 October 2022, parliament elected Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid as the Iraqi president. Two weeks earlier, MPs renewed their confidence in Muhammad Al-Halbousi as Speaker. Mohsen Al-Mandalawi replaced Hakim Al-Zamili as First Deputy Speaker, while Shakhawan Abdullah kept his post as Second Deputy Speaker. 

Two weeks after the presidential vote, on 27 October 2022, parliament approved the new government led by Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani, the Coordination Framework’s nominee. 

In the months surrounding Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali’s controversial statements, Iraq witnessed a period of relative calm. Muqtada Al-Sadr remained in political isolation, and tension in the region seemed to be cool until Saturday, 7 October 2023. 

 
At 6 a.m. that day, Hamas launched “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”, a surprise strike against Israel. It began with a heavy rocket barrage, followed by infiltration of Hamas fighters into Israeli territories. The assault left hundreds dead or wounded, including military personnel, and led to the capture of between 200 and 250 hostages, who were taken back to Gaza. 

Israel responded by officially declaring a state of war and began a wide-scale aerial bombardment of Gaza. 

By the next day, Hezbollah had launched rocket attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon, declaring solidarity with Gaza. 

On 17 October, Iraq was pulled into the conflict. A group calling itself The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack on the US Harir air base in Erbil. The group justified its actions by citing America’s open support for Israel. Since then, it has repeatedly targeted US forces in both Iraq and Syria, and on occasion, Israeli territory.  

On 19 October, a US Navy warship intercepted missiles and drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi movement toward Israel. The Houthis have continued their involvement in the conflict since then. 

The region had now fully ignited. Backed by the world’s most powerful nations, Israel found itself fighting on multiple fronts, on top of its devastating assault on Gaza. 

Believing Iran to be orchestrating the attacks from Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, Israel began targeting senior commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stationed in Syria. Though Israel rarely claims responsibility, a series of airstrikes left little doubt about the operations. 

On 1 April 2024, Israeli jets bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing 11 people, including senior IRGC commander Muhammad Reza Zahedi. 

In the span between 2 December 2023 and 2 April 2024, 18 IRGC members were assassinated in Syria. Among them were high-ranking commanders such as Muhammad Reza Zahedi, Reza Mousavi, Hojjatollah Omidvar, and Saeed Alidadi.  

On 13 April 2024, Iran launched around 350 cruise missiles and drones directly at Israel, the first direct attack by Tehran against Tel Aviv. Israeli officials claimed that 99 per cent of the projectiles were intercepted. 

Six days later, on 19 April 2024, Iranian authorities reported minor explosions in central Iran. They did not accuse Israel of involvement. Israel did not claim responsibility. 

Then, on 19 May 2024, a helicopter carrying former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, former Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, former East Azerbaijan governor Malek Rahmati, former Friday prayer leader of Tabriz Ayatollah Al-Hashem, and other officials crashed in a mountainous region near the Azerbaijan border. All on board were killed. 

The delegation had been returning to Tehran after attending the inauguration of the Qiz Qalasi Dam, a joint project between Iran and Azerbaijan, where they had met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. 

Iranian authorities attributed the crash to poor weather conditions. Images circulated in the local media showed the helicopter Raisi had used and the wreckage following the crash.  

  
Picture 8, Picture

The aircraft used by the Iranian president for his travels. Source: Iranian press. 

  

The wreckage of the aircraft after its crash with senior Iranian officials on board. Source: Iranian press. 

While Washington issued statements denying any foreign role in the helicopter crash, speculations spread widely that it was an assassination operation orchestrated by Israel. 

Israel remained silent. However, international and Israeli media cited unnamed sources and officials denied Tel Aviv’s involvement. Meanwhile, the war claimed the lives of several senior Hamas leaders. 

On 2 January 2024, Saleh Al-Arouri, Deputy Head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, was assassinated. 

On 13 July 2024, Muhammad Deif, the General Commander of the Al-Qassam Brigades, was also assassinated. 

On 31 July, 2024, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, was assassinated in Tehran. Israel withheld formal responsibility until 23 December 2024. 

Following Haniyah’s death, Hamas named Yahya Sinwar, the architect of Al-Aqsa Flood, as his successor on 6 August. Sinwar, too, was killed in a clash with Israeli forces on 16 October 2024. 

Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar were both assassinated by Israel in 2024. Source: Hamas Media. 

Iraq is not far behind 

Assassinations extended to Iraq, where the United States targeted and killed senior commanders of armed factions. On 4 January 2024, a US drone strike in Baghdad killed Mushtaq Al-Saidi, a prominent leader in Harakat Al-Nujba. One month later, on 7 February 2024, another US airstrike struck Baghdad, killing Abu Baqir Al-Saidi, a senior commander in Kata’ib Hezbollah, along with fellow commander Arkan Al-Ulaywi. The strikes came in retaliation for ongoing attacks on US stationed forces in Iraq. 

Throughout this period, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali continued to allude to the plan he had previously revealed. When asked about the force he had mentioned, he would simply respond, “Haven’t you seen what’s happening?” 

Gradually, a growing number of Iraqis began to wonder whether Al-Sheikh Ali’s claims were no longer mere fantasies. 

Funeral of Abu Baqir Al-Saidi in Baghdad. Source: Al-Forat News 

The war raged on. The Israeli army swept through Gaza by air and land. As Hamas began to collapse, Tel Aviv turned its attention north, to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based. 

Israel launched its war on Hezbollah with an operation that stunned the world. On 17 September 2024, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies wirelessly used by Hezbollah members exploded simultaneously across Lebanon and parts of Syria. These explosions resulted in at least 22 deaths and nearly 3,000 injuries, including civilians and health workers. Israel later claimed responsibility.  

Following this, on 13 September 2024, Israel intensified its airstrikes on Hezbollah positions in southern and eastern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs. Then, on 30 September, it announced the start of limited ground operations inside Lebanese territory. Leading to 23 September 2024, when Israel intensified its airstrikes on Hezbollah positions in southern and eastern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburb.  

On 27 September 2024, Israeli air raids on Beirut’s southern suburb claimed the lives of senior Hezbollah commanders as well as Iranian officers. Reports quickly emerged that it had targeted Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, and Ali Karaki, Hezbollah’s southern Front Commander, along with other leaders. Also killed in the blast was Major General Abbas Nilforoushan, the IRGC official in charge of the Lebanon portfolio.  

Hezbollah confirmed the news later that day. 

Then, on 30 September, Hezbollah announced the start of limited ground operations inside Lebanese territory. The operation resulted in tens of thousands of Lebanese civilians being displaced, and many being killed or wounded. 

The assassination of Nasrallah, a figure many believed to be untouchable, sent shockwaves through the ranks of the so-called Axis of Resistance. Panic spread quickly. Even Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was reported to have left Tehran for a secure location.  

A large poster of a person with a beard

AI-generated content may be incorrect., PictureA scene from the funeral of Abu Baqir Al-Saadi in Baghdad. Source: IRNA. 

In Iraq, militia leaders went into hiding. Among them were Qais Al-Khazali of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Akram Al-Kaabi of Harakat Al-Nujaba, Abu Alaa Al-Wala’i of Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Abu Fadak Al-Muhammadawi, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s second-in-command. 

Two days later, on 1 October 2024, Iran responded. This time using hypersonic ballistic missiles, fifteen times faster than the speed of sound, in retaliation for the assassinations of Nasrallah and Nilforoushan. Israel did not report any casualties from the attack. However, the Palestinian Civil Defence in the city of Jericho in the occupied West Bank announced that a man had died after being struck by missile debris. 

That same day, the Israeli army began a ground intrusion into Lebanon to target Hezbollah positions along the border. Tension escalated further when Israel swiftly assassinated Hasham Safi Al-Din shortly after he was named Nasrallah’s successor. 

On 26 October 2024, Israel announced it had carried out an airstrike on Iran, deploying more than 100 aircraft, including F-35 fighter jets and drones. Tehran described the attack as partial. 

Throughout this period, several widely followed bloggers began publishing content that aligned with Sheikh Ali’s statements, claiming they were receiving information from sources within international and regional decision-making centres. This reinforced speculations that Iraq was approaching a turning point.  

Though Iraq remained officially on the sidelines of the conflict, its unofficial involvement grew increasingly apparent as armed factions continued to launch attacks on Israel. 

Israel, for the most part, remained silent on Iraq. But on 25 September 2024, the Israeli army broke that silence, stating it was closely monitoring threats emanating from Iraq and vowed to “do what is necessary”. 

Two days later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented a map at the United Nations labelled “The Curse”. It marked five countries in black: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.  

  
“There is no place in Iran that Israel’s long arm cannot reach, and the same goes for the entire Middle East.” 

At the time, several reports emerged indicating that the Iraqi government had repeatedly asked Washington to pressure Israel to refrain from retaliating against Iraqi factions involved in the conflict. 

The quiet before the storm 

Relative calm returned to the region following a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, which came into effect on 27 November 2024. But that calm was short-lived. 

On 8 December 2024, Al-Assad regime, long backed by Iran, collapsed unexpectedly at the hands of the Syrian opposition. Speculations quickly spread that Iraq might be next. 

The concern deepened after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared, “We have toppled the Assad regime in Syria.” 

Amid the uncertainty, Al-Sheikh Ali took to X on 26 December, writing:  

“Wars are no picnic. Even the greatest wars led by history’s most renowned leaders never went as planned. There were always adjustments or delays. But in the end, the Tishreen Revolution will prevail.” 

The post was a response to a follower questioning the changing timeline of events. 

Calm returned once more on 19 January 2025, when Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire. 

Following that, Iraqi factions stopped launching rockets and drones. The Houthis also ceased their attacks on Israel and its allies. With this shift towards calm, anticipation of a major escalation in Iraq faded. Supporters of the Axis of Resistance appeared relieved, and many began to mock Al-Sheikh Ali’s previous warnings.   

This ridicule grew louder on 27 December 2025, when Al-Sheikh Ali announced that he plans to send a brief letter to US President Donald Trump. In it, he urged Trump to expedite the dismantling of armed militias and the expulsion of Iranian influence from Iraq. He asked his followers whether they supported the idea. Thousands replied in favour. 

As of this article’s publication, Al-Sheikh Ali had not published any updates regarding the letter. However, in recent posts, he continued to insist that Iraq’s political system was designed to be overthrown. 

In one post, dated 20 February, he wrote: “The turbans, the Revolutionary Guard, and the militias will be toppled. They will be bombed mercilessly. The order is: Do not let them breathe.” 

Al-Sheikh Ali’s persistence comes amid renewed signs that the region’s tensions have not been fully extinguished. 

On 21 February, former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri Al-Maliki said in a televised interview that Israel was planning to dismantle several countries in the region—Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. 

Maliki warned of efforts to use popular uprisings as a tool to topple targeted regimes, including Iraq’s. 

Similarly, political analyst Al-Fayez, speaking to Jummar, pointed to “an American and Israeli will to divide the region’s countries”, an idea he firmly rejected. 

On 27 February, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein warned that Israeli threats of a strike inside Iraq remained active. And on 5 March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the Israeli army was ready to fight on multiple fronts. 

The Houthi predicament 

On 15 March 2025, Donald Trump announced that he had ordered a major military strike against the Houthis in Yemen, threatening to eliminate the group entirely in response to what he called a growing threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea. 

Backed by Iran, the Houthis maintain full control over several Yemeni provinces, including the capital Sanaa, Dhamar, Al-Bayda, Ibb, Raymah, Al-Mahwit, and Amran. They also have near-complete control over large portions of other provinces, such as Al-Hudaydah, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, and Saada. 

In contrast, Yemen’s internationally recognised government, based in the province of Aden, maintains full control over Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah and holds significant authority in Marib, Lahij, Al-Dhalea, and Taiz. Most Arab and international governments, including Iraq, recognise this administration.  

 
Despite this, Iraq has maintained unofficial ties with the Houthis since 2018, during the premiership of Adel Abdul Mahdi. That year, the Houthis were permitted to open a central office in Baghdad, along with several branch offices. However, no official or public meetings have been held between Iraqi officials and Houthi representatives. 

Since 19 October 2023, the Houthis have carried out attacks on American warships and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. As part of their support for Gaza, they claim these ships are either linked to the US and Israel or bound for Israeli ports. 

 
According to the security firm Ambrey, the Houthis carried out more than 300 attacks on ships in the Red Sea over the past year. White House data shows that since October 2023, they have targeted US warships 174 times and commercial vessels 145 times.  

As a result, Trump vowed to “eliminate them entirely,” in his words. 

These developments have placed Iraq in a difficult position. After condemning earlier US-British airstrikes in January 2024 and Israeli strikes in July, the Iraqi government remained silent following the latest American offensive, likely a reflection of growing pressure from Washington to distance itself from the Axis of Resistance. Officials appeared reluctant to even issue a statement on the strikes in Yemen.  

Political sources say the Iraqi government is now facing immense international pressure to close Houthi offices and curb their activities in Iraq. In response, some restrictions have reportedly been imposed. However, the Iraqi state does not hold exclusive control over national security policy. Armed factions have their stance, often in defiance of official positions.  

On 20 March 2025, Foreign Policy magazine published a report claiming that Houthi fighters were using a training camp in Al-Khalis, in the Diyala province. Iraq’s Security Media Cell quickly denied the report. 

Then, on 22 March 2025, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi appeared surprisingly in Sanaa, pictured sitting with a group of Houthi leaders. According to official statements, Abdul Mahdi was in Yemen to attend a Houthi-organised event titled The Thirds International Conference – Palestine, the Cause of the Ummah. However, the true motive remains unclear, with conflicting speculation surrounding it. 

The Iraqi government did not comment on Abdul Mahdi’s trip to Sanaa. 

On 27 March 2025, Najib Ghallab, Deputy Minister of Information in Yemen’s internationally recognised government, alleged that Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) had begun sending fighters to Yemen. This is confirmed information,he stated. 

Iraq now appears increasingly entangled in the complexities of the Yemeni crisis, even as its government struggles to navigate a course that avoids provoking the anger of Trump and his allies over support for the Houthis. 

Laughing for no reason 

Amid intensifying American airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen, Donald Trump called on Iran to return to the negotiations table over its nuclear program, warning that failure to do so would result in military consequences. 

Initially, Iran rejected the call, insisting it would not engage in talks under the threat of force. But eventually, it agreed to negotiations. The first round was held in Oman on 12 April 2025, with the second round scheduled to take place in Rome, also mediated by Oman. 

Throughout these developments, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali has insisted that the US would strike Iran and that the information he shared nearly three years earlier was still valid. 

In a televised interview on 24 March 2025, he claimed the source of his information was “the president of the greatest country in the world”. When the host asked if he was referring to the United States, Al-Sheikh Ali responded with an ambiguous hand gesture and burst into laughter without explanation.  

 

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On 27 May 2022, Al-Sheikh Ali posted on X (formerly Twitter), warning that the leaders of Iraq’s armed factions would suffer “fatal setbacks” in 2024, a prophecy that no longer feels entirely out of step with reality.  

At the time, the region was relatively quiet. There were no major escalations to justify such a prediction. Only a handful of minor-impact rocket and drone attacks were taking place, mostly targeting American interests at Ain Al-Asad base in Anbar and the Harir base in Erbil. 

These attacks were claimed by groups with unfamiliar names. But it is believed that the groups consisted of militants affiliated with prominent Shiite factions who preferred not to claim responsibility openly to dodge direct accountability. 

This pattern wasn’t new. It had emerged after the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and escalated further following the US assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis in Baghdad on 3 January 2020. 

Three days before Al-Sheikh Ali’s post, a drone attack targeted Victoria Base, which hosts US forces inside Baghdad Airport. At the time, Iran was deep in negotiations to revive the nuclear deal, while Iraq remained stuck in a political deadlock following the October 2021 parliamentary elections.  

Western analyses argued that Iran was leveraging its armed allies in Iraq to pressure Washington—both in the stalled nuclear talks and in shaping Baghdad’s post-election power dynamics. 

Muqtada Al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist movement, pushed to form what he called a “national majority government”, one that sidelined Shiite factions aligned with Iran. 

Al-Sadr’s bloc secured 73 seats in the 2021 election. He moved quickly to build an alliance with Al-Taqaddum Coalition, led by Sunni politicians Khamis Al-Khanjar and Muhammad Al-Halbousi, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani. The alliance came to be known as the Tripartite Alliance. 

Opposing them was the Coordination Framework, a bloc of Iran-aligned Shiite parties determined to block Sadr’s attempt at reshaping Iraq’s political balance. What followed was a bitter deadlock between the two camps over who would form the next government. 

A meeting of the Tripartite Alliance at Muqtada Al-Sadr’s residence. Source: Sadrist Movement Media. 

The Tripartite Alliance failed, time and time again, to secure the quorum needed to elect a president, a constitutional step required before forming a new government. Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework effectively blocked each attempt, using what came to be known as the “disruptive third” tactic. Despite the deadlock, Muhammad Al-Halbousi was re-elected Speaker of Parliament in January 2022. Alongside him, Hakim Al-Zamili—a senior Sadrist figure—was named First Deputy Speaker, while Shakhawan Abdullah of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) took the role of Second Deputy Speaker.  

 Al-Zamili tightened his grip on parliamentary proceedings with this arrangement, while Al-Halbousi remained largely symbolic. 

As disputes over government formation deepened — and with parliament under Sadrist influence — a draft law to criminalise normalisation of ties with Israel was tabled for its first reading on the agenda on 11 May 2022. 

Just four days later, on 15 May, Muqtada Al-Sadr announced his temporary withdrawal from formation efforts, declaring a shift to “national opposition” for at least 30 days. 

By 26 May, parliament had passed the law banning normalisation with Israel. Then, 17 days later, on 12 June, Al-Sadr called on his 73 MPs to resign from parliament. Speaker Muhammad Al-Halbousi accepted the resignations without delay. 

Notably, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali’s cryptic post came just one day after the anti-normalisation law was passed. 

The final deadline 

Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali stayed silent about his post until a televised interview with journalist Sahar Abbas on 5 July 2022. There he declared: 

“2024 is the latest deadline for toppling and eliminating the current regime forever. It doesn’t matter if it happens a month earlier or later.” 

He spoke of an international force, “massive, decisive, destructive, and merciless”, that would bring about the regime’s collapse. 

Throughout the interview, Al-Sheikh Ali painted a graphic picture of Iraq’s rebirth: a respected state rising after the heads of the current political structure were killed, jailed, or executed. 

When asked about Muqtada Al-Sadr, he said there were two scenarios. Either Al-Sadr would meet the same fate as others. Or he would be allowed to leave Iraq before the operation began. 

Amer Al-Fayez, head of the Tasmem Alliance and a key figure of the Coordination Framework, told Jummar that the Framework dismissed the remarks outright. “The Framework doesn’t convene to discuss attention-seeking statements, whether from Al-Sheikh Ali or anyone else.” 

He insisted that any change in Iraq must come from the people, through elections alone. 

Just 25 days later, on 30 July 2022, Al-Sadr reappeared. He sent his supporters into Baghdad’s streets. They stormed the parliament building in the Green Zone and began an open-ended sit-in. 

The Coordination Framework responded on the same day, mobilising its own supporters elsewhere in the Green Zone. The power struggle had spilled into the streets. By then, parliament was under the Framework’s control, following the mass resignation of Sadrist MPs. Talks were underway to elect a new president and form a government. 

Many observers saw Al-Sadr’s move as an attempt to return, either out of regret or defiance.  

Photos of his followers roaming the halls of parliament spread rapidly. On the fourth day, he ordered to withdraw to the parliament. On the fifth, he demanded the dissolution of the parliament and early elections, threatening to maintain the sit-in unless his call was answered. The Coordination Framework rejected the request.  

The deadlock persisted until 29 August 2022. 

That morning, Al-Sadr announced his final and complete withdrawal from politics. His armed followers stormed the Green Zone. Clashes erupted between the Sadrist and unidentified forces. Some said they were Iranian fighters. Others blamed faction members, Green Zone security, or a mix of all three.   

An army officer told Jummar the military had been ordered to stand down. 

The clashes lasted from Monday into midday Tuesday, leaving casualties behind and prompting a nationwide curfew. Many Iraqis felt the absurdity had reached its peak. Quietly some hoped that Al-Sheikh Ali’s prediction might come to pass. 

Supporters of the Sadrist movement storm the Green Zone. Source: Social Media. 

Al-Sadr appeared in a televised address on Tuesday afternoon. In an attempt to display anger, he declared:  

“The killer and the killed are both in hell. What a wretched revolution this is.” 

He sought to distance himself from the violence, ordering his followers to withdraw within 60 minutes and end the sit-in around parliament. 

Reuters and other media outlets reported that the speech came after a sharply worded message from Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani’s office in Najaf.  

The Sadrists complied. Live broadcasts showed them retreating from the Green Zone, armed and in full view of army and police forces, who did not intervene. The curfew was lifted. Calm returned. Al-Sadr stepped back from the spotlight.  

The beginning of the earthquakes 

The Coordination Framework came out on top. On 13 October 2022, parliament elected Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid as the Iraqi president. Two weeks earlier, MPs renewed their confidence in Muhammad Al-Halbousi as Speaker. Mohsen Al-Mandalawi replaced Hakim Al-Zamili as First Deputy Speaker, while Shakhawan Abdullah kept his post as Second Deputy Speaker. 

Two weeks after the presidential vote, on 27 October 2022, parliament approved the new government led by Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani, the Coordination Framework’s nominee. 

In the months surrounding Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali’s controversial statements, Iraq witnessed a period of relative calm. Muqtada Al-Sadr remained in political isolation, and tension in the region seemed to be cool until Saturday, 7 October 2023. 

 
At 6 a.m. that day, Hamas launched “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”, a surprise strike against Israel. It began with a heavy rocket barrage, followed by infiltration of Hamas fighters into Israeli territories. The assault left hundreds dead or wounded, including military personnel, and led to the capture of between 200 and 250 hostages, who were taken back to Gaza. 

Israel responded by officially declaring a state of war and began a wide-scale aerial bombardment of Gaza. 

By the next day, Hezbollah had launched rocket attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon, declaring solidarity with Gaza. 

On 17 October, Iraq was pulled into the conflict. A group calling itself The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack on the US Harir air base in Erbil. The group justified its actions by citing America’s open support for Israel. Since then, it has repeatedly targeted US forces in both Iraq and Syria, and on occasion, Israeli territory.  

On 19 October, a US Navy warship intercepted missiles and drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi movement toward Israel. The Houthis have continued their involvement in the conflict since then. 

The region had now fully ignited. Backed by the world’s most powerful nations, Israel found itself fighting on multiple fronts, on top of its devastating assault on Gaza. 

Believing Iran to be orchestrating the attacks from Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, Israel began targeting senior commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stationed in Syria. Though Israel rarely claims responsibility, a series of airstrikes left little doubt about the operations. 

On 1 April 2024, Israeli jets bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing 11 people, including senior IRGC commander Muhammad Reza Zahedi. 

In the span between 2 December 2023 and 2 April 2024, 18 IRGC members were assassinated in Syria. Among them were high-ranking commanders such as Muhammad Reza Zahedi, Reza Mousavi, Hojjatollah Omidvar, and Saeed Alidadi.  

On 13 April 2024, Iran launched around 350 cruise missiles and drones directly at Israel, the first direct attack by Tehran against Tel Aviv. Israeli officials claimed that 99 per cent of the projectiles were intercepted. 

Six days later, on 19 April 2024, Iranian authorities reported minor explosions in central Iran. They did not accuse Israel of involvement. Israel did not claim responsibility. 

Then, on 19 May 2024, a helicopter carrying former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, former Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, former East Azerbaijan governor Malek Rahmati, former Friday prayer leader of Tabriz Ayatollah Al-Hashem, and other officials crashed in a mountainous region near the Azerbaijan border. All on board were killed. 

The delegation had been returning to Tehran after attending the inauguration of the Qiz Qalasi Dam, a joint project between Iran and Azerbaijan, where they had met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. 

Iranian authorities attributed the crash to poor weather conditions. Images circulated in the local media showed the helicopter Raisi had used and the wreckage following the crash.  

  
Picture 8, Picture

The aircraft used by the Iranian president for his travels. Source: Iranian press. 

  

The wreckage of the aircraft after its crash with senior Iranian officials on board. Source: Iranian press. 

While Washington issued statements denying any foreign role in the helicopter crash, speculations spread widely that it was an assassination operation orchestrated by Israel. 

Israel remained silent. However, international and Israeli media cited unnamed sources and officials denied Tel Aviv’s involvement. Meanwhile, the war claimed the lives of several senior Hamas leaders. 

On 2 January 2024, Saleh Al-Arouri, Deputy Head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, was assassinated. 

On 13 July 2024, Muhammad Deif, the General Commander of the Al-Qassam Brigades, was also assassinated. 

On 31 July, 2024, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, was assassinated in Tehran. Israel withheld formal responsibility until 23 December 2024. 

Following Haniyah’s death, Hamas named Yahya Sinwar, the architect of Al-Aqsa Flood, as his successor on 6 August. Sinwar, too, was killed in a clash with Israeli forces on 16 October 2024. 

Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar were both assassinated by Israel in 2024. Source: Hamas Media. 

Iraq is not far behind 

Assassinations extended to Iraq, where the United States targeted and killed senior commanders of armed factions. On 4 January 2024, a US drone strike in Baghdad killed Mushtaq Al-Saidi, a prominent leader in Harakat Al-Nujba. One month later, on 7 February 2024, another US airstrike struck Baghdad, killing Abu Baqir Al-Saidi, a senior commander in Kata’ib Hezbollah, along with fellow commander Arkan Al-Ulaywi. The strikes came in retaliation for ongoing attacks on US stationed forces in Iraq. 

Throughout this period, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali continued to allude to the plan he had previously revealed. When asked about the force he had mentioned, he would simply respond, “Haven’t you seen what’s happening?” 

Gradually, a growing number of Iraqis began to wonder whether Al-Sheikh Ali’s claims were no longer mere fantasies. 

Funeral of Abu Baqir Al-Saidi in Baghdad. Source: Al-Forat News 

The war raged on. The Israeli army swept through Gaza by air and land. As Hamas began to collapse, Tel Aviv turned its attention north, to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based. 

Israel launched its war on Hezbollah with an operation that stunned the world. On 17 September 2024, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies wirelessly used by Hezbollah members exploded simultaneously across Lebanon and parts of Syria. These explosions resulted in at least 22 deaths and nearly 3,000 injuries, including civilians and health workers. Israel later claimed responsibility.  

Following this, on 13 September 2024, Israel intensified its airstrikes on Hezbollah positions in southern and eastern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs. Then, on 30 September, it announced the start of limited ground operations inside Lebanese territory. Leading to 23 September 2024, when Israel intensified its airstrikes on Hezbollah positions in southern and eastern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburb.  

On 27 September 2024, Israeli air raids on Beirut’s southern suburb claimed the lives of senior Hezbollah commanders as well as Iranian officers. Reports quickly emerged that it had targeted Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, and Ali Karaki, Hezbollah’s southern Front Commander, along with other leaders. Also killed in the blast was Major General Abbas Nilforoushan, the IRGC official in charge of the Lebanon portfolio.  

Hezbollah confirmed the news later that day. 

Then, on 30 September, Hezbollah announced the start of limited ground operations inside Lebanese territory. The operation resulted in tens of thousands of Lebanese civilians being displaced, and many being killed or wounded. 

The assassination of Nasrallah, a figure many believed to be untouchable, sent shockwaves through the ranks of the so-called Axis of Resistance. Panic spread quickly. Even Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was reported to have left Tehran for a secure location.  

A large poster of a person with a beard

AI-generated content may be incorrect., PictureA scene from the funeral of Abu Baqir Al-Saadi in Baghdad. Source: IRNA. 

In Iraq, militia leaders went into hiding. Among them were Qais Al-Khazali of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Akram Al-Kaabi of Harakat Al-Nujaba, Abu Alaa Al-Wala’i of Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Abu Fadak Al-Muhammadawi, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s second-in-command. 

Two days later, on 1 October 2024, Iran responded. This time using hypersonic ballistic missiles, fifteen times faster than the speed of sound, in retaliation for the assassinations of Nasrallah and Nilforoushan. Israel did not report any casualties from the attack. However, the Palestinian Civil Defence in the city of Jericho in the occupied West Bank announced that a man had died after being struck by missile debris. 

That same day, the Israeli army began a ground intrusion into Lebanon to target Hezbollah positions along the border. Tension escalated further when Israel swiftly assassinated Hasham Safi Al-Din shortly after he was named Nasrallah’s successor. 

On 26 October 2024, Israel announced it had carried out an airstrike on Iran, deploying more than 100 aircraft, including F-35 fighter jets and drones. Tehran described the attack as partial. 

Throughout this period, several widely followed bloggers began publishing content that aligned with Sheikh Ali’s statements, claiming they were receiving information from sources within international and regional decision-making centres. This reinforced speculations that Iraq was approaching a turning point.  

Though Iraq remained officially on the sidelines of the conflict, its unofficial involvement grew increasingly apparent as armed factions continued to launch attacks on Israel. 

Israel, for the most part, remained silent on Iraq. But on 25 September 2024, the Israeli army broke that silence, stating it was closely monitoring threats emanating from Iraq and vowed to “do what is necessary”. 

Two days later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented a map at the United Nations labelled “The Curse”. It marked five countries in black: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.  

  
“There is no place in Iran that Israel’s long arm cannot reach, and the same goes for the entire Middle East.” 

At the time, several reports emerged indicating that the Iraqi government had repeatedly asked Washington to pressure Israel to refrain from retaliating against Iraqi factions involved in the conflict. 

The quiet before the storm 

Relative calm returned to the region following a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, which came into effect on 27 November 2024. But that calm was short-lived. 

On 8 December 2024, Al-Assad regime, long backed by Iran, collapsed unexpectedly at the hands of the Syrian opposition. Speculations quickly spread that Iraq might be next. 

The concern deepened after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared, “We have toppled the Assad regime in Syria.” 

Amid the uncertainty, Al-Sheikh Ali took to X on 26 December, writing:  

“Wars are no picnic. Even the greatest wars led by history’s most renowned leaders never went as planned. There were always adjustments or delays. But in the end, the Tishreen Revolution will prevail.” 

The post was a response to a follower questioning the changing timeline of events. 

Calm returned once more on 19 January 2025, when Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire. 

Following that, Iraqi factions stopped launching rockets and drones. The Houthis also ceased their attacks on Israel and its allies. With this shift towards calm, anticipation of a major escalation in Iraq faded. Supporters of the Axis of Resistance appeared relieved, and many began to mock Al-Sheikh Ali’s previous warnings.   

This ridicule grew louder on 27 December 2025, when Al-Sheikh Ali announced that he plans to send a brief letter to US President Donald Trump. In it, he urged Trump to expedite the dismantling of armed militias and the expulsion of Iranian influence from Iraq. He asked his followers whether they supported the idea. Thousands replied in favour. 

As of this article’s publication, Al-Sheikh Ali had not published any updates regarding the letter. However, in recent posts, he continued to insist that Iraq’s political system was designed to be overthrown. 

In one post, dated 20 February, he wrote: “The turbans, the Revolutionary Guard, and the militias will be toppled. They will be bombed mercilessly. The order is: Do not let them breathe.” 

Al-Sheikh Ali’s persistence comes amid renewed signs that the region’s tensions have not been fully extinguished. 

On 21 February, former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri Al-Maliki said in a televised interview that Israel was planning to dismantle several countries in the region—Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. 

Maliki warned of efforts to use popular uprisings as a tool to topple targeted regimes, including Iraq’s. 

Similarly, political analyst Al-Fayez, speaking to Jummar, pointed to “an American and Israeli will to divide the region’s countries”, an idea he firmly rejected. 

On 27 February, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein warned that Israeli threats of a strike inside Iraq remained active. And on 5 March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the Israeli army was ready to fight on multiple fronts. 

The Houthi predicament 

On 15 March 2025, Donald Trump announced that he had ordered a major military strike against the Houthis in Yemen, threatening to eliminate the group entirely in response to what he called a growing threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea. 

Backed by Iran, the Houthis maintain full control over several Yemeni provinces, including the capital Sanaa, Dhamar, Al-Bayda, Ibb, Raymah, Al-Mahwit, and Amran. They also have near-complete control over large portions of other provinces, such as Al-Hudaydah, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, and Saada. 

In contrast, Yemen’s internationally recognised government, based in the province of Aden, maintains full control over Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah and holds significant authority in Marib, Lahij, Al-Dhalea, and Taiz. Most Arab and international governments, including Iraq, recognise this administration.  

 
Despite this, Iraq has maintained unofficial ties with the Houthis since 2018, during the premiership of Adel Abdul Mahdi. That year, the Houthis were permitted to open a central office in Baghdad, along with several branch offices. However, no official or public meetings have been held between Iraqi officials and Houthi representatives. 

Since 19 October 2023, the Houthis have carried out attacks on American warships and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. As part of their support for Gaza, they claim these ships are either linked to the US and Israel or bound for Israeli ports. 

 
According to the security firm Ambrey, the Houthis carried out more than 300 attacks on ships in the Red Sea over the past year. White House data shows that since October 2023, they have targeted US warships 174 times and commercial vessels 145 times.  

As a result, Trump vowed to “eliminate them entirely,” in his words. 

These developments have placed Iraq in a difficult position. After condemning earlier US-British airstrikes in January 2024 and Israeli strikes in July, the Iraqi government remained silent following the latest American offensive, likely a reflection of growing pressure from Washington to distance itself from the Axis of Resistance. Officials appeared reluctant to even issue a statement on the strikes in Yemen.  

Political sources say the Iraqi government is now facing immense international pressure to close Houthi offices and curb their activities in Iraq. In response, some restrictions have reportedly been imposed. However, the Iraqi state does not hold exclusive control over national security policy. Armed factions have their stance, often in defiance of official positions.  

On 20 March 2025, Foreign Policy magazine published a report claiming that Houthi fighters were using a training camp in Al-Khalis, in the Diyala province. Iraq’s Security Media Cell quickly denied the report. 

Then, on 22 March 2025, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi appeared surprisingly in Sanaa, pictured sitting with a group of Houthi leaders. According to official statements, Abdul Mahdi was in Yemen to attend a Houthi-organised event titled The Thirds International Conference – Palestine, the Cause of the Ummah. However, the true motive remains unclear, with conflicting speculation surrounding it. 

The Iraqi government did not comment on Abdul Mahdi’s trip to Sanaa. 

On 27 March 2025, Najib Ghallab, Deputy Minister of Information in Yemen’s internationally recognised government, alleged that Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) had begun sending fighters to Yemen. This is confirmed information,he stated. 

Iraq now appears increasingly entangled in the complexities of the Yemeni crisis, even as its government struggles to navigate a course that avoids provoking the anger of Trump and his allies over support for the Houthis. 

Laughing for no reason 

Amid intensifying American airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen, Donald Trump called on Iran to return to the negotiations table over its nuclear program, warning that failure to do so would result in military consequences. 

Initially, Iran rejected the call, insisting it would not engage in talks under the threat of force. But eventually, it agreed to negotiations. The first round was held in Oman on 12 April 2025, with the second round scheduled to take place in Rome, also mediated by Oman. 

Throughout these developments, Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali has insisted that the US would strike Iran and that the information he shared nearly three years earlier was still valid. 

In a televised interview on 24 March 2025, he claimed the source of his information was “the president of the greatest country in the world”. When the host asked if he was referring to the United States, Al-Sheikh Ali responded with an ambiguous hand gesture and burst into laughter without explanation.