Iraqi decision-makers behave as if they are outside of the times. Indeed, they are — ignoring this critical stage that the country, the region, and the world are going through. At a time when a significant review of existing laws is needed to modernise the country, laws are going backwards.

In a heated and chaotic legislative session on Tuesday, January 21, 2025, the Iraqi Parliament voted on three sensitive and controversial laws: the amendment of Personal Status Law No. 188 of 1959, the Restitution Law for the return of properties which were confiscated under the now dissolved Revolutionary Command Council, and the Second Amendment to General Amnesty Law No. 27 of 2016. 

This vote was the result of complicated political agreements among different parliamentary blocs, with each faction pushing to pass legislation that serves its own agenda. Religious and political forces from the Shiite Coordination Framework wanted to pass the amendment to the Personal Status Law in exchange for other controversial laws backed by different groups. These included the General Amnesty Law, for which Sunni forces have been advocating, and the Property Restitution Law, supported by Kurdish factions. 

First: The Personal Status Law – Women’s rights vs. Freedom of belief 

Personal Status Law No. 188 was issued in 1959 under the government of Abd Al-Karim Qasim. It is considered one of the most progressive laws in the Arab world. It was based on a combination of the best provisions from Sunni and Shia jurisprudence, making it a unifying legal framework for marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. It has long symbolised the civil state’s efforts to transcend sectarianism and denominational divisions. 

With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, this law faced multiple attempts at amendment or repeal. The most notable effort was on December 29, 2003. At the time, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the provisional government of Iraq between July 2003 and June 2004, was chaired by the head of the Supreme Islamic Council, Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim. Although he only governed the IGC for one month, Hakim decided to abolish the law through Decision 137, referencing matters of women and family affairs to religious and sectarian authorities. The IGC reversed its decision two months later following widespread public and human rights pressure and fears of establishing a sectarian judicial structure in Iraq. The leader of the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA), Paul Bremer, took the final decision, which forced the council to freeze the ruling. 

The issue resurfaced in more detail with the proposal of the Ja’fari Personal Status Law on October 27, 2013, by the Shiite Fadhila Party, represented by Minister of Justice Hassan Al-Shammari. Although the council approved the draft, strong opposition from feminists, large segments of society, and both Iraqi and international human rights organisations prevented it from passing. The draft claimed that the legal age of marriage for girls would be nine years and for boys 15 years or younger. It also included provisions for temporary marriage, or mut’ah, which requires the presence of a religious cleric to certify the duration, which could range anywhere from a few minutes to several years. Additionally, it contained clauses that denied women financial support if their husbands were unable to “enjoy” them due to old age or extreme youth. 

On October 31, 2017, the Iraqi Parliament voted on a proposed amendment to the Personal Status Law. It was approved within minutes, with one objection due to the lack of quorum. The amendment allowed Muslims to submit a request to the Personal Status Court to apply personal status laws according to their jurisprudence. Corresponding to the husband’s sect, the court was required to abide by rulings issued by the Scientific Council of the Shiite Endowment Office and the Scientific and Fatwa Council of the Sunni Endowment Office. 

In short, this meant transferring the authority to decide on personal status matter, which are fundamental to individual freedom, from the civil court, as stipulated in Law No. 188, to religious clerics. 

In January 2025, the final amendment vote was backed by religious and political Shiite forces that saw the amendment as a response to Shiite citizens’ demands for applying Ja’fari jurisprudence. Their justification for the amendment was that it reinforced the principle of freedom of belief, preserved in Article 41 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants Iraqi families the right to choose the religious authority which would govern their personal matters. Article 2 of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of laws that contradict the fundamental principles of Islam, according to the parliamentary statement. 

This presented a dilemma. There was seemingly a clash between preserving women’s rights and legal gains in line with international standards and their personal freedom in choosing the laws that govern them. The paradox lay in the fact that a modern state traditionally has full legal authority, with all citizens subject to the same laws, without the option to choose their own legal framework. However, religious and conservative movements object to this concept and advocate for a system where legal matters are assigned to religious communities, similar to the millet system during the Ottoman Empire, which allowed different confessional groups to rule themselves under their own laws. The irony is that while new civil laws which are quasi-secular in nature oblige non-Muslims to abide by a unified system, it is mainly Muslims who are now demanding a return to an Islamic millet system. 

A similar judicial fragmentation exists in Lebanon, which Iraq has followed in many aspects, including this legal division. In January 1926, the French High Commissioner officially recognised the Shiite sect in Lebanon as an independent religious community, allowing it to govern personal status matters according to Ja’fari jurisprudence. This granted the sect official legal recognition, whereas its members had previously been subject to Sunni courts. Lebanon also witnessed an extended struggle over civil marriage, with interfaith couples often resorting to marrying in Cyprus, as Lebanese law did not accommodate such unions. 

Due to Sunni opposition to the personal status amendment in Iraq, it will not apply to Sunnis. Lawmakers, Islamic jurisprudence experts, and legal scholars, working in collaboration with the Iraqi State Council, were given four months to draft a compilation of Sharia rulings for both the Sunni and Shiite sects, which would then be go to parliament for vote. 

However, this could trigger further controversy, given the differences between Shiite religious authorities in Iraq and the varied Sunni jurisprudential schools. If a different Sunni Personal Status law is proposed, conflicting interpretations could lead to legal chaos. 

The amendment faced strong opposition from Sunni, feminist, and secular groups, who argued that it threatened the legal and judicial unity of the country and could worsen sectarian divisions. International human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch (in August 2024) and Amnesty International, also warned of the amendment’s consequences for women and girls’ rights. They stated that the law could legitimise child marriage, weaken or eliminate women’s rights to alimony, custody, and inheritance, expose women and children to increased risks of sexual and physical violence, as well as severe physical and psychological harm, and deny them educational and economic rights.  

The amendment has raised concerns about the further sectionalisation of the Iraqi judicial system. It would subject citizens to religious rulings that differ between sects, potentially leading to conflicting legal decisions, setbacks in women’s rights, and a decline in inter-sectarian marriages.  

Supporters of the amendment argue that it is rooted in respect for freedom of belief and insist that it will not be imposed on those who reject it, pointing out that the existing law will remain in place for those who wish to abide by it. Opponents contend that it threatens the hard-won rights of Iraqi women, which have been in place since 1959. 

In an attempt to dismiss concerns about the potential legalisation of child marriage, independent MP Mohammed Abdul Ameer Anouz from Najaf stated to Agence France-Presse (AFP) that the amended text, which was approved on Tuesday, retains the provisions of the previous law, setting the legal marriage age at 18 years or 15 years with the approval of a legal guardian and a judge. 

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Second: The General Amnesty Law – Sunni approval, Yazidi rejection, Shiite embarrassment 

The amended General Amnesty Law of 2016 in Iraq, proposed by the Legal, Security, Defence, and Human Rights Committees and supported by Sunni political forces, sparked another controversy for several reasons. The most notable was the lack of balance between achieving justice and ensuring that serious criminals and terrorists are not released and ensuring the fair treatment of those subjected to unjust or malicious rulings. However, some Sunni factions supporting the General Amnesty Law believe that it does not fully achieve their goal of including all prisoners. The Law excludes those convicted of terrorist crimes that resulted in death, permanent disability, the destruction of state institutions, or fighting against the armed forces. It also excludes perpetrators of crimes such as rape, incest, human trafficking, kidnapping, and normalisation of ties with Israel. 

Some see the law as a reconsideration of judicial rulings. It will allow for the retrial of convicts whose sentences were issued based on confessions extracted under torture or are based on reports from alleged secret informants. This includes hundreds of prisoners who have been sentenced to death. However, opponents argue that the amnesty will include those convicted of embezzling public funds, provided they repay the amounts embezzled. Nevertheless, the amendment has imposed restrictions on those holding the rank of general director or higher, preventing them from engaging in political work or running in election. According to MP Raad Al-Dahlaki, the amnesty is expected to cover about 60 percent of 67,000 prisoners. 

Sunni factions welcomed the law as part of the political agreement under which the government was formed in August 2014, and all subsequent governments up to the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, considering it a step toward justice for the wrongfully convicted. In contrast, the law angered the Yazidis, who saw it as an injustice to victims of terrorism and the violations they have suffered. They have called for an international intervention to protect them. Some Shiite factions have faced embarrassment in front of their voters with accusations of leniency toward terrorists whose hands are stained with Shiite blood. MP Habib Al-Hallaoui, head of the Sadiqoun bloc, the political wing of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, stated in a TV interview that the general amnesty would lead to the release of Shiites but would not result in the release of any Sunni prisoner. He alleged that it would return them to the judiciary. 

There are also broader objections regarding facilitating the release of those convicted of so-called honour killing and public fund theft, including those involved in the theft of the century due to vague provisions regarding the settlement of financial obligations in this case. The law is also criticised because it is a response to political pressure rather than a comprehensive legal reform. 

Third: The Property Law – A dispute between the Kurds and Arabs in Kirkuk 

This law aims to restore land and property expropriated under decisions issued by the now-dissolved Revolutionary Command Council to their original owners. It aligns with the interests of Kurdish political forces promising to compensate those affected in their regions, particularly those harmed by agrarian reform laws and urban expansion before 1979. 

The law angered the Arab Council in Kirkuk, which viewed it as a threat to the province’s stability and coexistence. The council argued that the law strips approximately 116,856 dunams of land in Kirkuk from thousands of Arab families and grants them to a specific group—namely, the Kurds—who claim to have been affected. The council contended that some of these individuals had already been compensated in the past or had their claims legally rejected and warned that the law could lead to the displacement of half a million citizens. It claimed that these lands belong to the Iraqi state according to the country’s constitution. The previous expropriation decisions were made to implement the Agrarian Reform Law No. 117 of 1970, which the council described as a significant and impactful law for the livelihood of the farming class. 

Amid warnings about the implications of this decision on Arab rights in Kirkuk, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Shakhwan Abdullah affirmed that the law contributes to strengthening civil peace and restoring rights to their rightful owners. Meanwhile, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani stated that the law was passed in cooperation with various political blocs and components. 

Passing laws amid political bargaining and opposition movements 

The passing of the amendment to the Personal Status Law was not isolated from the two other controversial laws. Political forces had agreed to pass the General Amnesty Law, backed by Sunni factions, and the Property Restitution Law, which Kurdish factions pushed for. This understanding suggests that political deals i.e., ‘vote for me, and I’ll vote for you’, were made to ensure that each side got what they want, at the expense of Iraq’s societal stability. Bundled voting was used as a manoeuvre to prevent one party from betraying the other, which reveals the levels of deep mistrust even among those in agreement.  

Opposing lawmakers have announced their intention to appeal to the Federal Court to challenge the legitimacy of the session and its decisions. Meanwhile, angry MPs have launched a petition to remove Parliamentary Speaker Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani, gathering over 50 signatures to protest the way the session was conducted and how the laws were passed. 

Additionally, the Coalition for the Defence of the Existing Personal Status Law No. 188 held a press conference in Baghdad and expressed its rejection of the amendment to the law. The coalition also confirmed that it had contacted international human rights organisations to pressure Iraqi decision-makers. 

Some lawmakers described the session as chaotic and argued that three contentious laws were passed through a bundled vote (the single basket method), a move they consider to be a blatant violation of the constitution and legal procedures. They also pointed out that new provisions were added to the laws without being presented for a first or second reading. 

MP Alya Nassif declared that the voting method was invalid. She said that “one law was sold in exchange for another,” a practice she warned could threaten national security. Similarly, MP Noor Nafeh condemned the session as a farce. She claimed that laws such as the Personal Status Law amendment and the General Amnesty Law were passed without lawmakers raising their hands to vote. 

It is worth noting that some MPs and members of the parliamentary praesidium walked out of the session in protest of these violations. Meanwhile, videos have circulated on social media platforms showing how the laws were passed without proper voting procedures, further fuelling doubts about the legitimacy and integrity of the session. 

The decline of public pressure and civil voices 

Following the U.S. administrator Paul Bremer’s decision to block the Abolition of the Personal Status Law in 2004 and the public and international pressure that halted the passage of the Ja’fari Personal Status Law in 2013 and 2017, the erosion of civil rights protections and the fading enthusiasm for political participation have contributed to the diminishing influence of public opinion and civil voices in Iraq today. 

In the aftermath of the 2019 protests crackdown, the absence of legal mechanisms to regulate and protect protestors from repression has discouraged civil and political activism, weakening society’s ability to push for reforms. This effect has been exacerbated by the lack of laws supporting independent media freedom, meaning that voices opposed to corruption and political dominance are unheard and lose influence. 

Amid ongoing political deals, parliament’s role is becoming increasingly marginalised and undermined, with its legal authority restricted rather than strengthened. These current laws and agreements do not reinforce parliament’s independence but instead hollow it out, reducing it to a seemingly symbolic institution under the control of select political figures. 

As a result, critical decisions, including foreign policy and key legislation, remain in the hands of a small group of leaders, insulated from both public and parliamentary oversight. Most agreements take place behind closed doors. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister’s authority has been confined to service management, widening the gap between the legislative and executive branches and solidifying the dominance of a political elite over Iraq’s governance. 

Freedom and women’s rights in Iraq 

According to Freedom House’s  Freedom in the World 2024 report, Iraq is classified as a “Not Free” country, scoring 30 out of 100 overall, including 16/40 in political rights and 14/60 in civil liberties. 

Regarding freedom of expression, Iraq has been ranked in the eighth category out of ten in a classification system developed by experts from the Index on Censorship and specialists in machine learning and journalism at Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU). This ranking indicates that freedom of expression in Iraq is “highly restricted”, placing it in the same category as Libya, Afghanistan and Zimbabwe. 

This decline in freedoms is attributed to the continued suppression of protests by authorities, their disregard for serious human rights violations committed by security forces and parallel armed groups, and the enactment of new laws designed to restrict freedom of expression further. Among these is legislation criminalising LGBTQ+ individuals, passed in May 2024. 

Additionally, the lack of accountability for security personnel responsible for violations during the 2019 protest crackdown remains a pressing issue. This climate of repression has contributed to low voter turnout, with only 41% of registered voters participating in the 2023 local elections, reflecting their lack of trust in the political process. 

Gender equality and freedoms in Iraq 

According to the 2020 annual report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Iraq, the country ranked 146 out of 162 in the 2019 Gender Inequality Index. While women hold 29.2% of parliamentary seats, this remains below expectations for greater representation. Additionally, only 39.5% of adult women have completed secondary education, compared to 56.5% of men. Women’s participation in the labour market is only 11.6%, compared to 74.2% for men. 

The report also highlighted the continued lack of protection against gender-based violence (GBV) for women and girls, including in Iraqi Kurdistan. It noted that 27.9% of women were married before the age of 18, and the adolescent birth rate stands at 71.7 births per 1,000 women, stressing the ongoing problems of child marriage. This problem could worsen with the implementation of new sectarian-based laws. 

The state of freedom and gender equality in Iraq presents major challenges, with deteriorating political and civil rights and persistent gender gaps. Despite some progress in women’s political participation, Iraq requires fundamental reforms to ensure the protection of basic rights and advancements in gender equality—a goal that recent legislative trends appear to contradict. 

The absence of strong legal protections for freedom of expression and independent journalism has also lowered Iraq’s standing in global rankings. At a time when Iraq, the region, and the world are undergoing critical shifts, Iraqi decision-makers continue to pass controversial laws that, in both their content and approval process, deepen divisions and contribute to setbacks in rights and freedoms. 

Regional and international dimensions and their legal implications 

These laws are being enacted amid a critical regional and international landscape, with growing pressures on Iraq regarding its relationship with Iran. This includes U.S. demands to disband Shiite armed factions. These pressures have intensified, mainly after these factions attacked bases hosting coalition forces in Iraq and participated in strikes against Israel following the attacks on October 7, 2023. 

The region is undergoing significant transformations which includes the expansion of Israel’s influence, Turkey’s growing role in northern Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s decline following the dramatic fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, along with the significant weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas. These sectarian laws could be used as a pretext to attack Iraq, demonise it, and label it as reactionary. 

The concept of the modern state and the current global order are facing clear challenges, with numerous indications of growing acceptance of change. This is particularly evident in the United States’ policy of isolation under President Donald Trump, who is showing less willingness to intervene globally. 

Examples of this include allowing the Taliban to impose a strict religious regime in Afghanistan, signs of acceptance of de facto authority in Syria, and even a statement by Eldar Alyautdinov, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Council of Scholars in the Spiritual Administration of Muslims—the highest Islamic authority in Russia—who issued a fatwa which permits polygamy in certain cases. This reflects a retreat from the concept of legal unity within the framework of the modern nation-state.