The killing of demonstrators in October 2019 was not a one-off act but rather an institutional and pervasive strategy to deal with the protests which were threatening Iraq's political system.

Two years after the October uprising, with Iraq’s current political stagnation, the events seem to be far from both public memory and government priorities. The use of violence hasn’t changed and the killing of activists and protesters continues. Thousands of injured people are floundering between hospitals in search of treatment. The killers have not been held accountable and the final number of those killed remains unclear. 

This article recounts the events that accompanied the October demonstrations in chronological order to show how the killings of protesters were not an individual act, but rather an institutional and pervasive strategy used to deal with the protests that threaten Iraq’s political system.

How did it all start? The water cannons that burned Iraq

In Iraq, a country with a rentier economy, the political class is in a fierce struggle centred on the control of government institutions in order to steal public money and entrench political existence. One cannot expect the government to be fully aware of the repercussions of its mistakes. It always defends its actions especially when it comes to security and the military. Iraq has lived through many years of terrible violence and the damage caused could have been remedied had the regime admitted its mistakes and worked to resolve them. This is how it all began and how, what was at first a hopeful plea, became an outcry which called for the demise of the regime. 

Iraq has not seen such protests since the proclamation of the state in 1921. Suppressed pleas, however, have been at the start of everything that happened in Iraq. The blood that was shed, the guns, the batons, the underground rooms used to conceal detainees, and the ensuing changes – with all of their contradictions and steps forward and backward – were all the result of embracing, defending, and glorifying the wrong regimes. 

This particular story began on September 25, 2019, in Baghdad, within the Green Zone where the government and legislative headquarters and decision-making chambers are located. A sit-in which took place, led mainly by people with degrees (bachelors, masters, doctorates), and lasted for almost a hundred days in front of the building of the General Secretariat of the Iraqi Council of Ministers was stopped^[1]. These protesters were demanding that they be employed in state departments, moving away from what they saw to be their life of demeaning unemployment. Despite the mild methods used by the protestors, the government still felt the need to suppress this sit-in.  At the time, Adel Abdul Mahdi, the former Iraqi prime minister, was proudly and repeatedly boasting his achievements, amongst which included the opening of the fortified Green Zone to citizens and the arranging of a series of agreements with China, from which he was returning during the dispersal of the sit-in.

Images of the dispersal of the graduates’ sit-in spread like wildfire, mainly across social media. The images resonated strongly with Iraqi citizens.  Some of the protesters who demanded employment had been humiliated by water cannons and these images became cemented in the minds of many Iraqis. This was a visual message that triggered anger in the youth and fuelled the ensuing uprisings. 

Paving the way for the October Protest and the Preparations for its Suppression

The protests that led to those which took place in October 2019 also resulted in threats from amongst the different parties of those power. Despite this, decision-makers were surprised by the magnitude of what came from the protestors and the threat they then felt from the ongoing struggles which have taken place since the establishment of the new political system in 2003.

Initially, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist movement, had given the prime minister-designate, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a deadline of October 2, 2018. This deadline had expired with the start of the October 2019 protests with no correlation between the two, according to sources inside the Sadrists^[2]. Qais al-Khazali, secretary-general of Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, an armed faction and part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, predicted that demonstrations would take place to overthrow the government of Abdul Mahdi in the tenth month for reasons he described as related to Iraq’s original position on the Bahrain’s Deal of the Century summit regarding normalisation of ties with Israel. His statement was made on 26 August 2019^[3], almost a month before the October protests began.

There were more preludes to the protests. The referral of Lieutenant General Abdul Wahab Al-Saadi on September 27, 2019 to the command of the Ministry of Defense, after being the commander of the forces of the Counter-Terrorism Service which played a significant role in defeating ISIS, made matters worse. Al-Saadi gained popularity among Iraqis during the battles to liberate the northern and western provinces from the Islamic State (IS) between 2014 and 2017. This further motivated young people to demonstrate as they saw authorities investigating a military leader whose appearance and style have long fascinated people and made them wish for military coup under his leadership to end the corrupt political process.

Saadi bears similar characteristics to Abdul Karim Qassem, who led the 1958 coup d’état in Iraq against the Hashemite monarchy. Descendants of those displaced to the capital Baghdad after the coup still love Qassem who was seen as just, poor, and from their social class. In the eyes of these people, Saadi also comes from a poor family and his simple and unassuming appearance is a reflection of the integrity that Iraqis dream of.  A large number of Iraqis believe that the road to real change in governance is closed as political parties always ensure their continuity through falsified elections that serve their own interests and do not allow newcomers. Therefore, you find the poor and those who feel afraid in light of the entrenched insecurity wishing for a military coup led by Abdul Wahab al-Saadi or those like him. This in a country with a long history of successful coups, in 1936, 1941, 1958, 1963 and 1968^[4].

These were the events that stimulated the large-scale demonstrations that would erupt on October 1, 2019, which would greatly impact on the lives of Iraqis as well as the world’s perception of them and their government, one founded on the rubble of dictatorial regimes trampled on by the American Abrams tank early in the new millennium.

The First October Wave and its Security Handling

At around 10 a.m. on October 1, 2019, several demonstrators began to gather in Tahrir Square in central Baghdad. Just before midday, the number had increased and traffic in the vicinity had been cut off. The authorities took the initiative to close the Jumhuriya Bridge connecting the square and the northern entrance to the Green Zone. As the crowd continued to grow, there was indiscriminate shooting at the demonstrators from one side of the bridge. During the following hours, which witnessed the first casualties, the authorities’ strategy was to push the demonstrators in the opposite direction towards the areas from which they came. Standing in a vertical line, security forces prevented the deployment of protesters who began to retreat under pressure from the Aviation Square to the area of Palestine Street and down to the municipal area.

The direction that the bulk of the demonstrators were pushed towards that day indicated their social and sectarian background. Northeastern part of Baghdad is inhabited mostly by exploited middle-class Shiites originally from southern Iraq and who were displaced to the capital in the thirties.

For 6 decades, areas in Baghdad’s which have been inhabited by displaced people from the south have experienced security control perfected by successive regimes. Governments have repeatedly disrupted the gathering of crowds in these areas. In 1963, the advance of large masses on their way to save the regime of Abdul Karim Qassem from the Baathist-led coup was quashed.

Subsequently, the Baath regime took control of these areas by planting their repressive institutions in their proximity from the east and west. After the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. military and Iraqi government succeeded in encircling these adjacent residential blocks in stages, particularly in 2004, 2005 and 2008 during the confrontations with the Sadrist movement^[5].

What happened in October 2019 was random in its first phase. In the face of an unorganized rush of demonstrators, the violence used by the security forces became fatal, lacking any of the logic usually employed by security leaders. As a result, a large number of martyrs were killed by heavy gunfire that was fired without reason.

Although international reports have previously indicated that there are over 7 million [ak1] weapons owned by Iraqi citizens, government violence was not met by retaliation from the families of the victims and their fellow demonstrators. This was surprising in a country that has been unstable for 17 years, and where weapons are used for the smallest reasons.

There were two reasons behind not using weapons: Firstly, that if the demonstrators had resorted to using weapons that would mean the loss of the peaceful aspect of their protest and, consequently, the loss of public support. Secondly, the fear of a protracted Shia-Shia conflict, especially as government forces and supporters spared no effort in painting this as an inevitable consequence, thus scaring people. 

Violence from the authorities was been repeated more than once during the first seven days of the protests.  They were temporarily stopped on the eighth day pending the end of the Arbaeen^[6] visit in Karbala. Demonstrations which started in Maysan and Wasit which were quashed when they reached Basra.

The following two days saw the killing of 18 protesters. The authorities imposed a curfew and cut off internet access to Iraq except for the Kurdistan region. Popular areas in Rusafa, north of Baghdad, witnessed turmoil due to the blocking of roads by protesters. The funerals of the victims of the demonstrations in these predominantly tribal areas turned into hotbeds of mobilization that supported taking revenge on the government. This was, however, deescalated with the infiltration of these gatherings by government forces.

Because Abdul Wahab al-Saadi and his popularity were the main cause of the anger that sparked the protests, his pictures were raised in most squares with demands that he lead a military coup to control the state. This prompted the head of the Popular Mobilization Authority, Falih al-Fayyad, to come out at a press conference claiming a coup plot has been overthrown. This speech provoked the crowds and caused public discontent on October 8, 2019. Crowds of demonstrators began erecting tents in Tahrir Square, something that continued for over a year and was the beginning of a long sit-in in the heart of Baghdad and a headache for the political process.

The sniper hypothesis in the first week of the October protests

On the fourth day of the protests, activists, in coordination with Iraqi media professionals living outside Iraq, documented video footage of injuries to protesters described as “sniper attacks.” Reuters’ Baghdad office quoted its own sources from within the Iraqi security forces accusing a faction of the Popular Mobilization Forces – specifically Saraya al-Khorasani, according to several bloggers – of being behind the sniper attacks on protesters.

The fifth day of the protests saw an armed force (members of which were later arrested and discovered to be members of the Popular Mobilization Security Directorate) attack the headquarters of television channels and a satellite broadcasting company providing coverage of the demonstrations to Arab channels.

After the end of the first wave of protests on the evening of 7 October 2019, the government – under pressure from the Najaf Authority, Amnesty International and a number of diplomatic missions – formed an investigative committee to determine the cause of violence against demonstrators. The committee was chaired by former Minister of Planning Nouri al-Dulaimi. The most prominent of the committee’s findings were the deaths of 149 demonstrators and wounding of 4,207, in addition to the  deaths of 8 members of the security forces across Iraq.

The report of the results of the investigation included a statistic from the Department of Forensic Medicine showing that 70% of the injuries of those killed in the demonstrations were in the head and chest areas. This reinforced the theory that the authorities used snipers placed in the buildings surrounding the protest area. However, the investigation did not accuse the PMF and recommended that security and military leaders, including a personal protection official in the presidency, be referred for investigation after their dismissal. This saw politicians and bloggers allied with the protests question the value of the investigation.

Investigations and events proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that security forces—official or not—were aiming to kill protesters. The bullet casings discovered on the rooftop of a building – documented in the report of the government commission tasked with investigating the causes of the violence – were of 5.8 × 42 mm quality. According to experts, these can be used both for sniper and ordinary weapons. Moreover, heavy and indiscriminate firing of live bullets at crowds inevitably causes large scale fatalities. 

The intentional targeting the leaders of the demonstrators with tear gas canisters was later proven, which reinforces the argument that snipers were used to target demonstrators in the early days of the October demonstrations. The government’s cover-up of the use of repressive force has allowed killers outside the security forces to get away with their crimes, thus protecting government forces themselves. Subsequent government justifications have emerged that must be mentioned – despite their heinousness– including the widespread use of hallucinogenic drugs among security forces on the one hand, and their lack of proper training in dispersing riots on the other. 

These justifications can only be understood as an attempt by official bodies to divert attention away from the decision to kill, a methodology adopted in dealing with demonstrations as well as some individual events for which personnel from within the security establishment are responsible.

In fact, these justifications later became a mode used by the security establishment. They did not prosecute the officers and senior ranking officials who gave direct orders to use live ammunition. Instead, they prosecuted security personnel who were carrying out the orders of their commanders^[7].

The Transfer of the Spark to the Southern Governorates

In addition to Baghdad, the provinces of Dhi Qar, Basra, Maysan, Wasit, Diwaniya, Najaf, Karbala, Babylon, and Muthanna witnessed similar protests in the first seven days. The nature of the protests in Dhi Qar took on a more violent dimension with the burning of the headquarters of Shia Islamist parties (except those of the Sadrist Movement) as well as the Communist Party. This phenomenon was a repeat of what was seen in demonstrations in Basra 2018 against the backdrop of high water salinity and the failure of the local government to provide services. However, this series of fires will continue and will affect Iranian consulates and the homes of officials^[8], which will create serious consequences and subsequent waves of retaliatory violence.

New protest squares, similar to Tahrir Square, appeared in the provinces, the most prominent of which were Haboubi Square in Dhi Qar, Thawra al-Thani Square in Najaf, and Al Bahriya Square in Basra. Each governorate had its own protest square, which many later saw the erection of tents for sit-ins.

Arrests and abductions meant the return of some of the protestors to their homes. Family pressure demanding that they stop protesting also saw many protestors return from the squares, even though the squares and tents represented a break from the society which they saw as reprehensible. 

The Second Wave of Protests  

After what might be seen as an improvised start to the demonstrations both from protesters and the reaction of the authority, the time came for better organization. Both sides prepared for the second round of protests in a more sophisticated manner.

The government surrounded the protest squares, in particular Tahrir Square, cutting off the surrounding streets and deploying security forces at their entrances. The first layers of security forces that confronted the protesters on the night of October 24, 2019 were not carrying deadly weapons, but this did not prevent the disaster that took place.

For their part, the demonstrators mobilized themselves well. They then settled in an abandoned building in Tahrir Square overlooking the Tigris River and the Jumhuriya Bridge, popularly called the Turkish Restaurant. The demonstrators called it “Mount Uhud”, giving it the status of a watchtower over riot control forces. The symbolism of the Turkish restaurant involved a very eloquent dichotomy, as the building itself has been home to government forces when suppressing previous demonstrations in Tahrir Square for over decade. Some of the politicians who were mocking demonstrators had even climbed the building in the demonstrations of 2011. For Iraqis, the building is one clear signifier of the regime’s failure and impotence. It had remained abandoned for nearly 17 years in the heart of Baghdad under the pretext that it was bombed by US forces using depleted uranium in 2003.

On October 25, 2019, there was movement towards government buildings throughout the southern governorates. Political headquarters were burned, and local government buildings were besieged despite the imposition of a curfew. These moves were not without painful sacrifices: 40 people were killed and more than 1,700 others injured on the first day alone^[9].

Civil disobedience  

Over the next days, the idea of calling for a general strike emerged, and the protestors called on students and educational staff to interrupt public life and activate civil disobedience. Groups emerged – often in the south – called the ‘Truancy Regiments’; the Sadrist movement’s supporters, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, were a key element of these groups. On 27^thOctober 2019, these efforts culminated in demonstrations by school and college students dressed in white and marked a watershed moment in the history of protests in Iraq. Students have been absent from public political protests since the 1960’s, and the image of student cohorts inside the tunnel leading to Tahrir Square at the beginning of each week became a key output of the protests and encourage a strong momentum in support of them.

With the sit-ins, two phenomena emerged that were key elements in further perpetuating the protests. The first was the presence of paramedics sent to treat many injured demonstrators before transferring them to hospitals. The second was the emergence of processions from the followers of Hussain, the grandson of Prophet Muhammed, whose activities in the month of Muharam spread to the protest squares to provide aid, food, water, and other services. Many of these services were also donated by professional unions and humanitarian organizations. However, official authorities spoke of the large amounts of funding in support of the protests that had originated mostly from outside Iraq, a reference to alleged external support to undermine the regime. Demonstrators confirmed that the amount of political money they had received was minimal compared to national charitable donations. They condemned foreign donations, and those which they received were rejected because of the attitudes of those behind them or because of their intellectual and political ideologies^[10].

Early November 2019 saw the beginning of the blockade of roads leading to oil fields in southern Iraq, specifically in Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar. The government forcibly dispersed the sit-ins, which were slowing down the oil industry, to ensure the continued flow of Iraq’s main resource. But this did not work, and things continued to escalate and developed into the besieging of the ports of Basra, cutting off the highway linking the southern provinces to Baghdad. This was to be repeated for over a year and coincided with a sharp drop in oil prices and a severe economic crisis.

The besieging of oil fields and ports and the blocking of highways pointed to a development in the mentality of opponents to the rentier state and its beneficiaries. The oil fields have become symbolic of why the regime has been able to survive – through draining this resource and splitting the profits – despite many civilians and protesters wanting to secure employment opportunities in those same fields before and after the October protests. 

Assassination, abduction, and arrests of protesters  

The first and second waves of the October protests, which lasted for a long period, saw the disappearance of many protestors. Most of these were unlawful arrests. Some of the abductees have since been released, but a number are still missing. The Iraqi government has not succeeded in finding a solution to this even since the change of leadership. Shortly before the end of the tenth month of demonstrations, the total number of detained was 158, of whom 123 were released, with 35 remaining in detention at the time^[11].

Assassinations began in Basra a day after the outbreak of protests with the killing of an activist and his wife inside their own home.^[12] These continued despite their occurrence over a sustained period of time, targeting activists throughout Baghdad and the southern provinces. The methods of assassination varied, from the use of motorcycles to chasing victims or breaking into their homes and firing at them directly. The use of bombs was, however, less frequent, with two victims targeted using this method. 

The pro-government media which were against the demonstrations legitimized assassinations, abductions and arrests in their coverage, underscoring the government’s determination to follow this approach. The activities of some armed factions, targeting specific protest leaders, also complemented this framing. The government and political class have legitimised these groups giving them the space to defend the regime in the belief that it is a Shiite regime supported by Iran and targeted by Sunnis and their external allies. Confronting and assassinating Shia activists, therefore,  is seen as an extension of the war on terror.

Deadly gas bombs

In the second wave of protests, after 25 October 2019, the authority replaced snipers with riot police and security forces who began firing tear gas canisters directly at the heads of protestors. On 28 October 2019, Safa al-Saray, a longstanding member of the protest movement, was killed in Tahrir Square, becoming an icon of the protest movement. His head was pierced by a gas canister that led to his death near the Jumhuriya Bridge. Over the following year of protests, this form of violence would be repeated frequently, despite the government repeatedly confirming that it had not given permission to shoot or aim weapons into the heads of protesters in order to disperse crowds. 

Battle of the Bridges

Some of the protesters, the majority of whom were followers of Sadr, chose to head east of Tahrir Square to disrupt the Al-Sinak and Al-Shuhada’a bridges. They succeeded in taking control of a garage overlooking the Tigris River and the Al-Sinak Bridge to be used in the same way as the Turkish restaurant (Mount Uhud) was used in Tahrir Square. However, the number of demonstrators dwindled as they moved away from the heart of Baghdad and, despite  slogans calling for the closure of government headquarters throughout Rusafa during the curfew, life was returning to a certain kind of normal. The number of employees that went on strike did not reach as large a percentage in Baghdad in comparison to the southern governorates. Government employees would be subjected to online harassment on social media which often prevented them from taking part in strike action. It should be noted, that this phenomenon did not seep into the congested street which reinforces the peaceful aspect of the protests^[13]. 

At this time, the number of victims had reached over 319 people killed during the protests. According to Iraq’s Independent High Commission for Human Rights, another 15,000 were injured^[14].

The Massacres

Before the end of November 2019, the second month of protests, and a day before parliament accepted the resignation of former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, Najaf witnessed a wave of violence close to the shrine of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim following attempts by protesters to storm it and burn down its main gate.

At the same time, Nasiriyah witnessed the massacre of dozens of protesters near the Zeitoun Bridge. The massacre came after battalions of the Rapid Reaction Forces (one of the government’s security faction) were sent following the appointment of the controversial and violent Lieutenant General Jamil al-Shammari as security supervisor of Dhi Qar. Orders for direct fire exposed the tacics used by the government to control the situation in the southern province. A mistrust between the forces active in the region on the one hand and the authorities in Baghdad on the other began to emerge.

On 5 January 2019, demonstrations took place demanding the implementation of the requests of the Najaf Authority, who called for for the demonstrators to filter out rioters and subversives from their ranks. These demonstrations were the first mass protests held by the PMF followers since it was created. The protesters, described as ‘loyalists’^[15], decided to go towards Tahrir Square, which they entered without incident. However, sources agreed that a number of these protesters had been abducted,  rumoured to be by groups affiliated with the Sadrist Movement who were claiming to protect the demonstrator with a group of followers called the “Blue Hats”. The next day, a violent confrontation took place in the Sinak garage between the PMF demonstrators and the mainly Sadrist protesters. The PMF intervened using live fire, causing casualties in the vicinity of the garage, al-Khalani Square, and near Tahrir Square.^[16]

The massacres continued until February 2020, when Sadrin Square in Najaf saw a new wave of violence which brought about the death of more than twenty victims due to an escalation in violence between the Sadrist public and civilian protesters rejecting the presence of Sadrists in the protests.^[17]

The conflict between the U.S. presence and Iran’s allies

The protests were preceded by several systematic airspace violations and the shelling of a number of PMF locations in Iraq. According to statements issued by the United States, Israel was behind these operations on the pretext that there were Iranian ballistic missiles in the possession of factions within Iraq that could hit Tel Aviv.^[18] Since these attacks, an undeclared truce between the U.S. presence in Iraq since 2014 and the Shiite armed factions allied with Iran ended. The bombing of a base and killing of an Iraqi-American contractor were the reason for U.S. attacks against PMF headquarters in conjunction with the protests.

The period between December 29, 2019, when U.S. aircraft bombed the headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces and killed 25 fighters on the Iraqi-Syrian border, and January 3, 2020, when a U.S. drone assassinated Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis at Baghdad International Airport, was one of the most critical periods of the protests. 

The demonstrators split into two groups. The first group made no secret of its joy at the killing of the Quds Force commander and deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Authority on the basis that they are supporters of the government of Abdul Mahdi and have a hand in suppressing the protests. The second group did not want to side with invading forces that were considered to have violated Iraqi sovereignty. Despite trying to combine the two positions into consolidated statements, this divide grew from day to day. With the withdrawal of the Sadrist movement from the protests and the emergence of signs of the spread of the Coronavirus around the world and in Iraq, the Friday prayers which had previously given the demonstrators a significant morale boost were put on hold. The resignation of Abdul Mahdi, which opened the door to many theories on who might be his successor, also weakened their enthusiasm and started a bidding war over his replacement. All of these reasons led to the withdrawal of demonstrators, in particular the number of protesters in Baghdad, despite the continued violence in provinces such as Dhi Qar and Basra, where the abduction and murder of activists continued. 

This conclusion is not enough!

The scenes of the October demonstrations have come and gone and have not led to a leadership which is accepted by all parties. Fragmentation and decentralization has left a huge vacuum which has meant that the protests have been unable to transform into a political force. This has thwarted the chances for institutions that could put pressure on those in power to structurally change the way security forces deal with protestors or indeed to hold those leaders who gave orders to kill protesters accountable. Human rights defenders who protested or sympathised with the October 2019 protests have not organized into a single front to condemn power, repression, and violence. Instead, we have relied on individual efforts to release detainees or document murders and kidnappings.

On the ground, the protesters had little to guarantee their safety from severe repression. Some simpler measures – such as the Tahrir Shield, a youth initiative to repel tear gas canisters – are evidence to the fact that the violence used by the authorities was too great to be repelled or minimized.

The government has succeeded despite all of its conflicting forces in discouraging and weakening the protests. It used its media, security and political arms to reduce the momentum of the protests. The government of Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has also made deals with influential protest leaders in order to disperse the demonstrations and halt the sit-ins. 

The Iraqi government’s handling of the Tishreen protests was similar to the repression of the 2009 Iranian protests or the Arab Spring protests that began in 2011. However, the Tishreen protests were characterized by not holding the officials and forces of the state responsible, and instead blaming ambiguous third party forces.

^[1] Statement of the Inspectorate of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior dated 26 September 2019.

^[2] Statement by Sadrist Movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr on October 19, 2019.

^[3] A private interview with the leader of Asaib Ahl al-haq Qais al-Khazali on August 26, 2019, with local satellite channels, including Al-Ahed and Iraqiya.

^[4] Wassim Rifaat Abdul Majeed Al-Ani, “Coup Iraq – A History of Successful and Failed Coups in Iraq 1921-2003”, Dar Al-Jawahiri, 2015.

^[5]    Michael R. Gordon, “The United States Begins Construction of a Wall in Sadr City,” New York Times, April 18, 2008.

^[6] A Shia religious observance that occurs forty days after the Day of Ashura. It commemorates the martyrdom of Al-Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of prophet Muhammad.

^[7] Statement by the Joint Operations Command dated 7 April 2021.

^[8] Statement of a senior officer to Al Jazeera Net, September 24, 2021.

^[9] Iraq protests: 40 dead as mass unrest descends into violence, BBC, 25 October 2019.

^[10] Author interview with demonstrators from a tent (No one loves Iraq as much as we do), on May 15, 2021.

^[11] Statement by the Independent High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq dated 27 October 2019.  

^[12] A statement by an Iraqi security official in the Basra province to the Al-Ain News Agency, October 3, 2019.

^[13]   Statement by the Independent High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq, November 10, 2019.

^[14]   Statement by the Independent High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq, November 10, 2019.

^[15]   The term was popularized in Iraq after the October protests and means Shia Iraqis who believe in the mandate of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

^[16] A statement published on the official website of the Popular Mobilization Authority on December 9, 2019 and later denied, claimed that its website had been hacked.

^[17]   Statement of the organizing committee of the October Revolution demonstrations on February 6, 2020.

^[18]   Citing an article by Jonathan Spire, director of the Middle East Center for News and Analysis and a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, published by the Wall Street Journal on August 2, 2019.

 [ak1]I changed this to 7 million as that is the latest figure I found