Halabja recently became a province through political agreements and a renewed power struggle, following decades of chemical attacks, suffering, and manipulation. Will this newly created province be drawn further into the growing contest for control? Or could it mark a new beginning, one that is situated among cities in transition?

After more than four decades, Halabja has officially become Iraq’s 19^th province. It is now the fourth province within the Kurdistan Region.  

The Iraqi Parliament approved the decision in mid-April 2025 with a majority vote. Many saw the move as long-delayed recognition and symbolic justice for one of the worst crimes of the modern era: the Ba’ath regime’s chemical bombing of the city in 1988, during the final months of the Iran-Iraq War. 

 
On that day, 5000 people were killed. They were mostly children, women, and older residents. An additional 7,000 and 10,000 were injured. In the years that followed, many others died from long-term health complications, disease and deformities caused by exposure to the gas. The city continues to suffer today, with its soil and agriculture particularly affected by the lasting impacts of the brutal massacre. 

The process of converting Halabja into a province has taken around 12 years, beginning with the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) decision to approve its conversion in June 2013. This was followed by a vote in the Kurdistan Parliament in February 2015, which formally designated it as a province within the region. The new province, comprising Halabja District and the surrounding districts of Sharazoor, Penjwen, and Said Sadiq, was previously part of Sulaymaniyah Province. 

Efforts resumed in 2013 at the federal level, as political actors in Baghdad attempted to push through the city’s plan. But political bargaining between Kurdish parties and their Shi’a and Sunni counterparts proved stronger than the formal authority of Iraq’s institutions. As a result, Halabja remained caught in a prolonged struggle for federal recognition. According to media reports, at least 200 families have been migrating each year to other areas due to rising unemployment, lack of investment and the absence of industrial and development projects. Agriculture and industry, once central to the region, have suffered amid declining government support. 

After years of delays, a key moment came during a parliamentary session when Shi’a parties opened negotiations with Kurdish blocs. They attempted to link the bill to other contentious files, including legislation related to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), as well as proposals to convert certain Shi’a-majority districts into provinces. These included Tal Afar in Nineveh Province, Tuz Khurmatu in Salah Al-Din, and Al-Faw in Basra. 

The reclassification of Halabja into a province was a rare event in Iraq. But something even more unexpected occurred: Nukhsha Saleh was appointed as the governor of Halabja. It marks the first time in Iraq’s modern history, spanning over a century, that a woman has held the position of provincial governor. 

The new law has created opportunities for Halabja, including political, legal, and economic entitlements, as well as annual financial allocations. It also generated thousands of jobs across administration and security, from the governor and their deputies to the provincial council, district offices, and public services directorates. Most of these institutions will be connected to the federal government in Baghdad.  
 
This could suggest that the Kurdistan Region’s share of the national budget will increase beyond previous allocations. Halabja will also receive its own share of medicine and petroleum products, as well as federally supported investment projects across several sectors. 

However, the province is likely to face significant political, economic, and electoral competition over future privileges. This will be in the areas of administration, security, executive powers, and financial budgets.  
The changes are likely to shift the political balance within the Kurdistan Region, intensifying rivalry between the region’s two main parties: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). 

 
The longstanding division of power – with Erbil and Duhok under KDP control and Sulaymaniyah under the PUK – will now evolve. Halabja’s inclusion strengthens the PUK, which could reshape the internal dynamics of Kurdish politics.  

At the regional and international levels, Halabja is expected to become a site of competing influence, reflecting broader trends across the Kurdistan Region. Turkish military expansion and Iranian political influence have become defining features of the area. Halabja, which shares a border with Iran, is strategically important as a commercial gateway and a site with multiple border crossings, including Shushme–Twila and Bashteh. It also has the potential to contribute to Iraq’s tourism industry, with natural attractions that could flourish if protected from political corruption and mismanagement. 

Yet despite the benefits Halabja stands to gain as a newly established province, there are reasons for caution. Between 2000 and 2003, the city and nearby areas, including Twila and Biyāra, became strongholds for extremist groups such as Anṣār Al-Islām, Anṣār Al-Sunna, Al-Qāʿida and other militias aligned with ISIS. The PUK fought prolonged battles to expel these groups. 

But military operations and security campaigns failed to fully eliminate extremist ideology, which resurfaced in 2014 when ISIS seized large parts of Iraq. Several young men from the area joined the group. Since then, Kurdish security forces have uncovered further ISIS sleeper cells in the region. 

There is also a possibility that regional powers will seek to capitalise on Halabja’s historic significance, using it as a site for investments which are aligned with their interests. If these interests clash with the Kurdistan Region’s policies, it could result in efforts to destabilise the area, including through the revival or support of extremist groups. Such tactics have previously been used to undermine security in countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. At the same time, Western powers may view Halabja as a potential bargaining tool in their broader confrontations with Iran.