This is the story of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Commission, three rebellious factions, and the debate on dissolving the factions or integrating the commission into security institutions. What is happening behind the scenes which involved the dissolution of the PMF?  

The Shiite leadership and Iraqi government deny plans to dissolve the PMF but instead lean towards the concept of controlling arms. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani refuses to discuss claims of a so-called external request to dissolve the PMF, yet internally he has not denied the intention to withdraw weapons. 

In practice, and based on previous experience, controlling arms has little real meaning in Iraq. Since the new political system was established after the U.S. occupation in 2003, this demand has existed. It remains unfulfilled. 

Iran has two stances regarding the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF): a public stance supporting the paramilitary force’s continuation and a more flexible behind-the-scenes approach. 

What is happening can be described as a manoeuvre between Baghdad, Tehran, and Washington as all parties were waiting for Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The populist U.S. president, whom Iraqis perceive as unpredictable, could work in favour of the Shiite factions known as the Coordination Framework. 

According to Ammar Al-Hakim, one of the most prominent leaders of the Coordination Framework, the Shiite coalition recently received messages that stated Washington would be taking measures regarding the PMF. 

These are not the first such messages. Previous warnings were even more severe. Early last year, key field commanders within the factions were assassinated before an undeclared truce between the factions and the United States in February 2024 temporarily stopped further escalations. 

All of this is happening amid growing frustration among some Shiite figures due to certain rebellious factions within the PMF, as internal tensions continue, with some factions hoping for the elimination of others. 

Muqtada Al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist movement, controls three factions within the PMF. He described the rebellious groups as shameless militias. 

Eight years ago, the idea of integrating the PMF began to gain traction. This followed a number of incidents which involved them disregarding military orders and also financial irregularities related to the factions’ salaries. 

Later attempts followed under different labels, such as the restructuring of the PMF, but this ended with the Tishreen protests of 2019. 

The Syrian experience 

The term factions was not commonly used on the Iraqi streets after 2003. At the time, Sunni extremist groups had a more dominant influence, including Al-Qaeda under the name Tawhid and Jihad.  They later became ISIS, along with several other offshoots such as Faylaq Omar, Ansar Al-Sunna, Jaish Al-Mujahideen, The Islamic Army, and Naqshbandia, among others. 

On the Shiite side, Al-Mahdi Army, a militia originating from the Sadrist movement’s base and led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, was the PMF’s primary counterpart. However, Sadr froze the group in 2008. 

Since then, Al-Mahdi Army went through multiple restructures and renaming, including Al-Mumahhidun and Liwa Al-Yawm Al-Maw’ud, before becoming Saraya Al-Salam.  This transformation brought a dove symbol to its flag and insignia. Within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), it operates Brigades 313, 314, and 315, whose exact numbers are undisclosed but are estimated to exceed 10,000 fighters. These forces are primarily stationed around Samarra, south of Salah Al-Din, north of Baghdad. 

After freezing Al-Mahdi Army and withdrawing from the scene, new factions emerged, such as Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, which later became a significant political force within the Shiite establishment. Meanwhile, the name Kata’ib Hezbollah gained prominence in the public sphere, especially following the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, when they decided to intervene under the pretext of defending Shiite shrines. 

Thirteen years later, these factions disappeared under mysterious circumstances from Syria amid the collapse of its regime. 

Qais Al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, one of the most prominent Shiite factions within the PMF, recalled the early events in Syria. He said, “Our view in 2011 was that the targeting was directed against the Shiite community and the shrine of Sayyida Zainab. We believed participating at the time would give us experience, as we expected the events to extend to Iraq.” 

By the time Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad fled on December 8, 2024, the number of factions in Syria was estimated to be around 20, the most notable of which were: 

• Harakat Al-Nujaba, led by Akram Al-Kaabi, was deployed in Sayyida Zainab, Aleppo, Hama, Latakia, and Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria. 

• Kataib Imam Ali, led by Shibl Al-Zaidi, was active in the countryside of Damascus, Daraa, the Aleppo countryside, and Latakia. 

• Martyr Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr Forces, a faction of the Badr Organization (led by Hadi Al-Amiri), was deployed in Sayyida Zainab, Hama, and the countryside of Idlib. 

• Liwa Kafeel Zainab, affiliated with Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (led by Qais Al-Khazali), was deployed in Sayyida Zainab, the airport road, Eastern Ghouta, Aleppo, and Qalamoun.   

• Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, led in Iraq by Abu Ala Al-Wala’i (a key figure in the Coordination Framework), was active in Sayyida Zainab and Eastern Ghouta.   

• Kataib Hezbollah, led in Iraq by Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, was deployed in Sayyida Zainab, Eastern Ghouta, and Deir ez-Zor. 

All the factions that participated in Syria later became part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This humiliated the Iraqi government due to its relationship with Washington. This forced then-Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, 2014–2018, to declare, “Any Iraqi entity fighting in Syria does not represent us”.

The Iraqi project and its criticism 

In June 2014, ISIS openly spread in Mosul and rapidly expanded, eventually seizing control of 200,000 square kilometres, more than a third of Iraq’s territory. 

Volunteers, including factions that had already gained combat experience in Syria, mobilised under the banner of Jihad Al-Kifai. A call was issued by the Shiite religious authority in Najaf, represented by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, to confront the extremist group. 

These groups continued to be referred to as volunteers in the religious authority’s statements, while in Shiite political circles, they were known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF Law was officially passed by parliament in 2016 to formally recognise the force. 

The law was extremely brief, consisting of only four articles, and was passed despite objections from around 90 MPs, most of whom were Sunnis. It was enacted during a critical security period and lacked key details which led to significant challenges. 

Faleh Al-Fayyad, who has led the PMF Commission since its inception, barring five months, attempted to downplay political objections to the law. In a press conference in Baghdad following the passage of the PMF Law in November 2016, he stated that “the concerns raised behind closed doors by opponents of the law were very limited”. 

However, criticism mounted regarding the behaviour of some factions during some city liberation operations. Meanwhile, Ammar Al-Hakim’s parliamentary bloc, Al-Muwatin, described the PMF as sacred and its missions as blessed. By contrast, Salim Al-Jubouri, Speaker of Parliament at the time, denied that the law granted immunity to those who committed violations. During a press conference after the vote, he asserted that the PMF Law did not provide immunity to anyone. He also clarified that the Prime Minister, who is the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, would determine the PMF’s troop numbers and emphasised the need for a proportional representation system based on Iraq’s provinces. 

At the same time, Osama Al-Nujaifi, then Vice President of Iraq and leader of Muttahidoon coalition, a key faction in the Sunni-led Iraqi Forces Alliance, argued that passing the PMF Law weakened state institutions, disrupted the balance in the security apparatus, and aimed to create parallel forces within the armed forces, emulating other countries and regimes, a reference to Iran and its Revolutionary Guard. 

The Conflict with Al-Abadi 

Law No. 40 of 2016 on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF Commission) was enacted based on an executive order issued by former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi a few months before the legislation was passed. This order aimed to regulate the military group’s structure. 

The most notable provision in the executive order called for the political disengagement of PMF members from all political, party, and social frameworks, explicitly stating that political activities within its ranks would not be allowed. However, these factions remain affiliated with political parties actively participating in the government. 

Just days before the PMF Law was passed, MPs were surprised when Haider Al-Abadi withdrew the draft from parliament for amendments. However, the final version remained weak and brief, as Al-Abadi could not introduce substantial changes due to factional pressure. 

The issue of political activities within the PMF Commission was a major concern for Al-Abadi, as he completely lost control over the organisation, especially after his former ally, Faleh Al-Fayyad, the head of the commission, sided with the factions despite previously running alongside Al-Abadi’s bloc in the 2018 elections. 

In response, in May 2018, Al-Abadi dismissed Fayyad from his positions as National Security Adviser and PMF chief, citing his engagement in political activities. However, just five months later, a court ruling reinstated Fayyad as the head of the commission. 

Political activity covered what was happening behind the scenes within the PMF until disputes emerged over party funding through PMF salaries. 

After leaving office in 2019, Haider Al-Abadi stated in an interview with Al-Iraqiya that PMF leaders had accumulated wealth at the expense of public funds under unclear circumstances. 

Earlier in 2018, a document circulated in local media, reportedly prohibiting PMF movements, without Al-Abadi’s approval. The PMF issued a statement accusing Al-Abadi of employing a punishment-based policy and withholding fighters’ allowances. 

At that time, Qasim Dhaif, the PMF’s chief financial officer, was killed under mysterious circumstances. In May 2018, Haider Al-Abadi stated that Dhaif’s killers would not intimidate him, accusing corrupt PMF leaders of being involved in the assassination. 

A year earlier, during a meeting, Al-Abadi had urged PMF leaders to maintain the same level of discipline in their statements as they do on the battlefield. At that time, PMF leaders had publicly stated their intention to enter Syria after reaching the border. This was confirmed in a statement by Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the PMF’s former deputy commander, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in early 2020, along with Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, near Baghdad Airport. 

Violations 

In 2016 and 2017, at the peak of the fight against ISIS in Iraq, Human Rights Watch released two reports condemning the PMF’s actions in Sunni-majority cities. In the first report, the organisation accused PMF forces of abducting and killing dozens of Sunnis, as well as demolishing homes, mosques, and Sunni-owned businesses, stating that such acts could amount to war crimes. 

The following year, Human Rights Watch called on Iraqi authorities to investigate alleged violations in Al-Hawija area, southwest of Kirkuk. In 2017, Sunni political factions in the Iraqi parliament accused the PMF of abducting Iraqis in Baghdad. 

By 2021, Amnesty International called for disclosure of the fate of 643 men and young boys who had disappeared five years earlier, allegedly abducted by PMF-affiliated groups. 

Since 2014, after PMF factions took control of Jurf Al-Sakhar in Babil, south of Baghdad, following a brief occupation by ISIS, residents have been prevented from returning. Farmlands were destroyed during the battles, and authorities halted last-minute illegal land sales, according to Sunni MPs. 

The area was completely depopulated, with 13,000 families – over 65,000 individuals – displaced. The return rate remains at zero percent. 

A similar evacuation and return ban were imposed in Al-Awja, the hometown of former President Saddam Hussein in Tikrit, Salah Al-Din. Al-Awisat, also in Salah Al-Din, remains off-limits to its native residents. 

Obstacles to full repatriation persist in some towns and villages, such as Sulaiman Bek in eastern Salah Al-Din. PMF factions are also accused of obstructing the return of a significant portion of displaced Yazidis to Sinjar, north of Mosul. 

Between 2016 and 2020, residents of Mosul and Salah Al-Din complained about the spread of so-called economic offices in areas liberated from ISIS. These offices, affiliated with PMF factions, were involved in selling war remnants and scrap metal alongside accusations of oil smuggling. 

Following the official defeat of ISIS in late 2017, PMF members took off their military uniforms. They wore business attire, using these offices to establish economic partnerships with various Sunni forces in those areas. These networks still operate today, having effectively replaced former local economic authorities. 

Internal disputes within the factions 

Money fueled a power struggle for control of the PMF, evident in the rivalry between Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the former PMF deputy commander, and Faleh Al-Fayyad. This tension became particularly clear during the Tishreen protests of 2019. 

In December 2019, Al-Sinak Massacre took place in central Baghdad, at the peak of Tishreen protests. In this massacre, 24 people were killed, and around 100 injured in an attack carried out by factions believed to be affiliated with the PMF. 

At the time, videos surfaced showing forces in Iraqi army uniforms freeing detained civilians, with some in the footage saying, “We came to free you from Hezbollah”. This scene followed a statement published on the PMF’s official website, urging all PMF factions to refrain from participating in any missions within protest areas. 

However, despite this directive, a four-wheel-drive vehicle entered the protest site in Baghdad, randomly firing at protestors. 

At the time, the PMF issued a statement acknowledging that its fighters had opened fire. However, it claimed that the intervention was a response to pleas from protesters allegedly being attacked by vandals clashing with armed members of Saraya Al-Salam, the militia loyal to Muqtada Al-Sadr. 

Shortly after releasing the statement, the PMF’s official website claimed it had been hacked, and the statement was deleted. 

These events revealed internal disputes between Al-Fayyad and Al-Muhandis regarding the PMF’s management and response to the protests. The conflict resurfaced just days after Muhandis’ assassination, when Abu Fadak Al-Muhammadawi, a senior commander in Kataib Hezbollah, was forced upon Al-Fayyad as PMF Chief of Staff, replacing Muhandis. 

The following year, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, which had become more politically active after 2014 and secured a ministerial position in Sudani’s government, launched a coordinated campaign to remove Al-Fayyad from the PMF leadership, citing his retirement age. However, for reasons that remain unclear, the faction later lost momentum in its push for his dismissal. 

Dissolving the PMF 

During a period of peak tensions between the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the government under Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi’s rule, information was leaked about a plan to reduce the number of PMF members. Al-Abadi repeatedly delayed the disbursement of PMF salaries. This was allegedly due to doubts about the accuracy of the registered personnel numbers and the presence of so-called ghost employees, Al-Fadhaiyun, a term in Iraq referring to individuals who receive full salaries or share them with superiors without reporting for duty. 

At the time, Haider Al-Abadi attempted to reduce the number of PMF personnel to 25,000, down from 120,000. However, the force has since expanded significantly, now exceeding 220,000 members. According to the 2024 budget, it costs the state over 800 billion dinars annually, around 610 million US Dollars. 

Despite this, Al-Abadi never called for the dissolving of the PMF. At the height of the battle against ISIS in 2017, he stated that the PMF would not be disbanded and would remain under the authority of the state and religious leadership. 

Al-Abadi left office without arresting a single ghost employee from the 50,000 he claimed existed in the Ministry of Defence, an allegation he could not prove. 

When Adel Abdul-Mahdi succeeded him, he raised the salaries of the PMF to match those of the Ministry of Defence soldiers. At the time, MPs from Asaib Ahl Al-Haq criticised Al-Abadi’s tenure, accusing him of trying to reduce the PMF’s members to appease the United States. Meanwhile, as the new prime minister, Abdul-Mahdi pledged to find financial resources to support the PMF’s presence. 

However, the honeymoon period with Abdul-Mahdi did not last. Despite being seen as more in favour of the PMF than Al-Abadi, he was later accused of carrying out a soft coup within the organisation. In the summer of 2019, just months before the Tishreen protests erupted, he issued an executive order to restructure the PMF. It was perceived as a precursor to dissolving the force, although he never explicitly stated such an intention. 

Abdul-Mahdi granted himself the authority to appoint the head of the PMF Commission. This angered several factions and led to an apparent rebellion against the decision. However, the issue faded when protests erupted. Abdul-Mahdi’s government resigned at the end of 2019. 

At the time of the executive order’s announcement, Kataib Hezbollah dismissed any discussion about the new PMF structure. Instead, they urged the government to expel US troops from Iraq. Their response came amid rising tensions between Tehran and Washington. 

Simultaneously, the Shabak faction in Nineveh Plains refused to comply with Abdul-Mahdi’s order to withdraw from the area. Faleh Al-Fayyad requested two months to implement the decision, but it was only partially enforced later under Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. The faction retreated just a few kilometres following accusations that it had launched rocket attacks on Kurdistan. 

Kadhimi, who succeeded Abdul-Mahdi in 2020, avoided any mention of dissolving or restructuring the PMF. However, he was the only prime minister since 2003 to arrest members and leaders of factions, most notably Qasim Musleh, the PMF commander in Anbar province. 

After Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s government was formed in the fall of 2022, the political agreement document signed by major political forces included a provision to remove factions from the cities. This measure has yet to be implemented. 

Sudani remained silent on the status of the PMF until Hezbollah in Lebanon suffered what was perceived as a major blow when Israel assassinated its top leadership, including its long-standing Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in September 2025. This was followed by the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2025. This reintroduced discussions about dissolving the PMF, this time with greater seriousness than before. 

At the end of 2024, a government adviser revealed in a television interview that the United States had requested the dissolution of the PMF. Or, as he put it, they would take matters into their own hands. Following this statement, prime ministerial advisers were temporarily barred from speaking to the media. 

Days later, Prime Minister Sudani publicly denied these claims, but the controversy did not end. Ammar Al-Hakim, one of the leaders of the Shiite Coordination Framework, disclosed that the U.S. had sent messages warning that factions would be targeted unless their weapons were placed under state control. 

Additionally, Speaker of Parliament Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani, in an interview with an Arab news channel, stated that Trump had requested that Sudani ensure all weapons remain under government control. 

All this unfolded during a period when Iraqi factions had completely halted their activities, a decision taken since the ceasefire in Lebanon was announced at the end of November 2024. Additionally, they had committed to ceasing attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq since February of the same year. 

Disengagement 

In Iraq, there is confusion between dissolving the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), arms control, uncontrolled weapons, integrating factions into the PMF, and integrating the PMF into the Ministry of Defence. The most widely used term is ‘arms control’. This vague expression has been employed by several figures, including Haider Al-Abadi, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, and before them, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, and the Americans in 2004 when they purchased the weapons of Al-Mahdi Army. The religious authority, represented by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Najaf, has also used this term multiple times, most recently in a statement issued in November 2024. It was also referenced by Mohammad Al-Hassan, the head of the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), after visiting the Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani at his home in Najaf. 

Discussions about arms control or uncontrolled weapons are often misinterpreted and viewed as related to other areas. As stated by a member of the Coordination Framework, the factions interpret this demand as referring to tribal or even American weapons. Meanwhile, Ammar Al-Hakim—who has a faction within the PMF—was firm that the Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s statement referred to the factions. 

On the other hand, it appears that the factions are trying to twist Sistani’s words and even use them politically. Toward the end of the year, media that is affiliated to the PMF spread information claiming that the highest Shiite religious authority had rejected Hassan’s request to dissolve the PMF. To date, this has not been confirmed. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is currently purchasing weapons from civilians, a measure widely criticised as impractical and one that has never included the weapons of the factions. 

Some Shiites, inside and outside of the Coordination Framework, believe that integrating the factions could be a viable way to ease American concerns over their alleged cooperation with Tehran. However, this is also unrealistic. Most of these factions are already part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), whose 2016 law recognises it as an independent entity, similar to the Counter-Terrorism Service. 

The Coordination Framework denied discussing the integration of the PMF into the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the withdrawal of factions from certain cities. This clarification came just days after Prime Minister Sudani visited Tehran, where he met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei later tweeted a statement attributed to Sudani, expressing an intention to strengthen the PMF and advising Iraqis to expel American forces. However, just two days before Trump’s return to the White House, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein alleged that there had been attempts to persuade factions to lay down their arms. 

Behind closed doors, Shiite political forces discuss the defiance of three factions not adhering to the PMF’s directives. The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, reported on a recent meeting between Prime Minister Sudani, the head of the PMF, and the three well-known factions: Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Al-Nujaba, and Sayyid Al-Shuhada. 

Al-Akhbar reported that the factions, which had announced the suspension of military operations following the implementation of the Gaza ceasefire, refused to give up their weapons. This further complicates the government and the Shiite alliance’s stance on these factions. 

Given Iran’s regional setbacks and Trump’s strong support for Israel and its projects, many fear that the options are narrowing to either dismantling the PMF or confrontation. Many Iraqis believe that Baghdad now has an opportunity to rid itself of the burden of armed groups and withdraw from Iran’s increasingly weakened sphere of influence in favour of strengthening Iraqi state sovereignty.