In a corner of southern Iraq, where the city of Suq al-Shuyukh is enveloped by the bustle of the day and the heavy silence of the night, began Hussein’s story (a pseudonym). A man in his twenties, Hussein neverimagined that ordinary friendships would lead him to a confrontation with a mysterious religious group.
Hussein says the story began through meetings with young men he got to know through mutual friends. They gathered in homes and attended Husseini mourning gatherings—religious ceremonies held by Shia Muslims to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein—with nothing at first to arouse suspicion. Gradually, however, the nature of these meetings began to change.
The conversations turned into unusual discussions involving unprecedented ideas. Members of the group began speaking about Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib—the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law—in an extremist manner, claiming that he was a god, worthy of absolute veneration, and that proving one’s loyalty required sacrificing one’s life.
At first, Hussein did not understand what they meant, but he noticed that everyone who became close to the group was assigned a serial number of unknown purpose, such as 120 or 140, making the organisation appear secretive.
The matter did not stop there. He was continually asked to recruit younger people who would be easier to influence, particularly those with limited education who could barely read, making them more likely to accept the group’s ideas without question.
Meanwhile, reports of people dying by hanging allegedly because of their affiliation with the Qurban Group, out of devotion to the Imam—whom the group believed to be divine—became increasingly frequent, although the true reasons behind these deaths remained unknown.
One night, a meeting was held at the home of one of the members under the supervision of their leader. They sat in a silent circle before lit candles. As the leader recited prayers and incantations, glorifying the Imam and placing him in the position of God, Hussein’s candle suddenly went out. The group regarded this as a blessing and a sign that he was “chosen for the sacrifice”.
They informed him that he was required to end his life by hanging—the method commonly associated with such cases in Dhi Qar—or by shooting himself. When he tried to back out, they coldly refused, telling him,”This is your choice with the Imam, and there is no turning back.”
Seeing no other way out, he reassured them that he would carry it out. Instead, he immediately went to the police and filed an official complaint.
Because of his limited ability to memorise and the fact that he had not obtained an academic qualification, Hussein could not remember everything they had repeated during the meetings. Since that moment, however, he says he has continued to receive death threats via Telegram.
Today, he lives in constant fear, hiding inside his home and leaving only under the protection of his brother. His story has thus become one of narrowly escaping the rituals of a secret group that places the Imam in the position of divinity, rather than a search for spirituality.
A Leader Based in Mashhad
In an exclusive interview with Jummar, an investigating officer from a high-ranking security agency revealed mysterious details surrounding the Qurban Group, which security officials describe as one of the most extremist and enigmatic ideological groups.
According to the officer, security information indicates that the group’s leader, an Iraqi man operating under the alias Ali Abdul Munim, adheres to beliefs centred on venerating Imam Ali to the extent of regarding him as the “Creator of the Universe”.
Abdul Munim has been based in the Iranian city of Mashhad for years. He moved between several Iraqi Islamist parties during the 1980s before his extremist ideas took shape.
Security agencies say they are still unable to explain how his ideology developed. What is certain, however, is that the group has adopted a strategy of targeting young people between the ages of 12 and 20, particularly those who are socially and psychologically vulnerable and those with limited education.
The group exploits these circumstances by filling their minds with promises of eternal life and bliss in the afterlife, encouraging them to take their own lives as a path to salvation from the “sufferings of this world”, using psychological methods that resemble the propaganda of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS).
The officer added that the group recruits members by initially presenting themselves as ordinary religious individuals who attend religious gatherings and accompany young people on pilgrimages to holy shrines, particularly in Iran, before gradually introducing their beliefs.
Although information about the group’s rituals remains limited, most of those detained—currently numbering in the dozens—are individuals whose suicide attempts failed or who were arrested before carrying them out.
Organisationally, the group operates according to a secret cellular network structure, in which each small group is led independently of the others, making it extremely difficult to uncover the entire network.
While the exact number of followers in Dhi Qar is unknown, security estimates indicate that the group’s total membership may exceed one thousand people, with a clear concentration in the Suq al-Shuyukhdistrict, south of Nasiriyah.
An intelligence source revealed that the group’s activities have begun spreading to the governorates of Diwaniyah, Basra, Maysan, and Babil.
The group also possesses its own book, titled Imam Ali, which contains narrations attributing divine qualities and godly powers to the Imam, primarily targeting adolescents under the age of 18.
The source warns that the group’s spread is expanding, in the absence of appropriate legislative provisions, this allows the group to exploit any spaces made available under the guise of freedom of expression in order to expand and recruit more followers.
Concerning Indicators
Dr. Adi Bajai, a professor of sociology, at the College of Arts, University of Dhi Qar, believes these groups seek to distinguish themselves from the norms of society by presenting themselves as an alternative path, relying on a system of values and norms that gives their followers a sense of belonging to a closed circle.
Bajai classifies these movements as esoteric groups, which rely on a secret interpretation of religion that establishes a spiritual system different from the prevailing understanding.
Explaining the concept of qurban, Bajai tells Jummar that it is presented as a means of attaining spiritual closeness to Imam Ali and the highest degree of devotion.
He notes that the concept itself is not new and predates Islam. However, extremist groups have repurposed it as a salvation religion, convincing young people that the ultimate sacrifice grants them spiritual transcendence and an exceptional status, making them more susceptible to emotionally charged, closed ideological narratives.
Ali Al-Nashi, head of the Humanitarian Communication and Brotherhood Organisation and a member of Dhi Qar’s Committee for Combating Extremism, revealed worrying figures.
In 2025, the governorate recorded around 85 suicides, 15 of which were linked to extremist religious motives.
In the same context, a source in the Dhi Qar National Security Service confirmed that around 35 people were arrested in 2025 on charges of belonging to this group, noting that the actual number of detainees could be considerably higher, given that other security agencies are also involved in the investigations.
This phenomenon is not the first of its kind in Iraq. It was preceded by other groups active in the southern governorates of Nasiriyah, Basra, and Maysan, which adopted slogans centred on allegiance to Imam al-Mahdi.
Among the most prominent was the Promised Yamani Movement, founded by Ahmed Ismail Kataa in the early 2000s.
Kataa, an engineering graduate and seminary student, began promoting his ideas in 2002. Although he was arrested under the previous regime, he returned in 2004 to publicly declare his movement, adopting the title “Ahmed al-Hassan, the Promised Yamani”, and claiming direct communication with Imam al-Mahdi—the final Imam in Twelver Shi’ism, whose followers believe has remained alive since his birth in 869 and in occultation, awaiting his reappearance to establish justice on earth.
The movement attracted followers, established several offices, and published two newspapers, Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem and Sarkhat Al-Haqq, before eventually becoming militarised.
During Muharram in 2008, armed clashes erupted between the movement and security forces, resulting in the deaths of four security commanders and dozens of followers. The movement was ultimately dismantled and disappeared completely.
A Fertile Environment for Extremism
Following the emergence of the Yamani movement, another movement known as Ashab al-Qadiya (The People of the Cause), also referred to as The Forerunners of the Mahdi, emerged. Concentrated in southern Iraq, particularly in Nasiriyah, the movement espouses an ideology that identifies Americans with the figure of al-Sufyani, whom Imam al-Mahdi is believed will fight upon his reappearance.
The movement later split into two factions: Ruh Allah, which believes that the late Iranian leader Ruhollah Khomeini entered occultation and will return as the Mahdi, and Al-Naba’ al-Azim, which believes that the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is the Mahdi.
In 2023, Ashab al-Qadiya exploited al-Sadr’s call for spiritual retreat (i’tikaf) at the Kufa Mosque to declare the “Great Pledge of Allegiance”, prompting al-Sadr to cancel the ritual and describe them as “corrupters.”
Following this, the Karkh Investigative Court coordinated with the National Security Service to arrest 65 suspects on charges of inciting sectarian strife.
The group’s activities were not confined to Iraq. Clerics in Iran were also seen promoting the same ideas in Persian accents.
Meanwhile, the movement of Mahmoud al-Hasani al-Sarkhi also emerged. Al-Sarkhi had been expelled in 1998 by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Muqtada al-Sadr’s father) for following what he described as a “Sufi” behavioural approach.
After the fall of the regime, from his base in Karbala, al-Sarkhi claimed to be the most learned religious authority and adopted a number of controversial positions, including issuing a fatwa permitting what he called “Islamic rap”. His Husseiniyas became venues for musical performances, and his call to demolish religious shrines sparked public protests that ended with the arrest of dozens of his followers and preachers, as well as the closure of his mosques.
Iraq has also witnessed the emergence of other unconventional groups, such as Al-Imam al-Rabbani in Diyala, Al-Mukhtar (The Revolution of Divine Love) in Baghdad, and the armed group Jund al-Sama’ (Soldiers of Heaven), which was eliminated in 2007.
A senior security source also revealed that authorities have recently been monitoring the Akhbari Group, an organisation that relies on indirect electronic communication to recruit followers.
Academic Hussein al-Ziyadi believes that Nasiriyah—with its deep Sumerian heritage—has always been a place where ideas intersected. However, he argues that the convergence of this diversity with deteriorating living conditions and unemployment has created a fertile environment for the spread of extremism.
Al-Ziyadi warns that external actors may be supporting these movements to destabilise the social landscape, exploiting weak religious literacy.
He concludes that cultural identity alone is insufficient to counter extremism. It needs to be accompanied by improved economic conditions and the development of a moderate religious discourse that is capable of protecting younger generations from the exploitation of religion.
A Search for Identity
In February 2025, Iraq’s Ministry of Planning announced that the poverty rate in Dhi Qar Governorate had fallen to 15 per cent, a significant decrease compared with around 40 per cent in 2018.
Despite this decline, the unemployment rate among those aged 15 and over remains at 13.5 per cent, reflecting persistent challenges in the labour market.
Demographically, the average household size in the governorate stands at 6.59 people, with a difference between urban areas,6.25, and rural areas,7.46.
Dr. Jumaa al-Hamdani, Director of the Dhi Qar Centre for Historical Studies, explains that Nasiriyah—founded in the late Ottoman period—has historically been known for its urban and civic character, distinct from Bedouin traditions, and has long served as a centre of creativity and peaceful coexistence.
Al-Hamdani told Jummar, “The period after 2003 witnessed the emergence of forms of outward religiosity lacking genuine religious knowledge, which led to misunderstandings of collective ritual practices and transformed them, among segments with limited awareness, into intellectual extremism.”
He adds that the intersection of political transformation with religious discourse aimed at winning public support has further complicated the situation.
With Dhi Qar’s population approaching two and a half million people, poverty among young people contributes to feelings of marginalisation and limited educational opportunities, driving some to search for identity and belonging through extremist interpretations of religion.
