Between July and September 2025, Iraqi political forces and figures spent more than one million US Dollars on paid advertisements on Facebook and Instagram, according to Meta’s data. Yet, the striking fact is that 60 percent of this spending came from pages with no declared political identity. This article tracks, through figures and details, how Iraq’s political actors are pouring vast sums into the digital sphere.

n Iraq’s electoral landscape, the competition for seats has shifted from rallies and speeches to the small screens accompanying voters every moment — turning phones into the central arena for influence and persuasion. Between early July and the end of September 2025, political groups, local entities, and individual candidates spent around one million US Dollars on paid ads on Facebook and Instagram, according to official data from Meta’s Ad Library, which monitors sponsored political campaigns worldwide — even though the official election campaigns had not yet begun during these months. 

Behind these numbers lies a revealing paradox: over 60 percent of the spending came from pages that did not declare any political affiliation or specify a sponsor in the “Paid for by” field. In other words, most of Iraq’s online electoral money is moving without an identity, even though the content is clearly targeted and geographically directed at the most competitive provinces. 

This investigation relied on Meta’s reports for the past 90 days (aggregated by province and sponsor category), in addition to detailed ad files from early November. Spending was calculated using the average range per ad. The texts were automatically classified (Arabic/Kurdish) as direct or indirect, then reviewed manually. Any political affiliation not publicly verified was left as “unclassified.” 

Baghdad tops the digital spending map with around 282,000 US Dollars in just three months — roughly a third of all Iraq’s online election spending. It is followed by Nineveh (around 113,000), then Dhi Qar and Basra (about 60,000 each), with Babil, Erbil, and Najaf ranging between 50,000 and 58,000. Meta’s data also shows that smaller provinces, such as Qadisiyyah, Wasit, and Babil, were not absent but had lower spending. 

Yet the data reveals not only the scale of spending but also the absence of transparency: more than 60 percent came from pages that disclosed no party or sponsor in the “Paid for by” field — meaning that most digital election campaigns operate under an unknown identity, though they convey a clear partisan message. 

Unclassified pages dominate the field 

These unclassified pages spent about 600,000 US Dollars, far exceeding individual candidates (around 173,000) and political parties (109,000). The rest was split among coalitions (63,000) and local officials (25,000). 

In terms of messaging, analysis of hundreds of sponsored posts showed that online political advertising focuses less on programmes or policies and more on narratives of proximity, trust, and belonging. 

In southern and central Iraq, tribal and religiously tinged social messages dominate, invoking local symbols and deriving legitimacy from social ties rather than political content. 

In major urban centres, the language of achievement, service, and development prevails, while some candidates adopt a managerial tone focusing on competence and projects. In northern provinces, by contrast, ads take a straightforward electoral form, using Kurdish language and direct references to names, numbers, and symbols. 

Public pages as political fronts 

Dozens of Iraqi Facebook pages appear as neutral news or community platforms. Yet tracing their sponsored ads shows that many conduct disguised political campaigning, promoting specific actors without openly declaring affiliations. 

In a detailed sample analysed during the first week of October 2025, pages like Multaqa al-Bashaer, Bukhari Jamil, Multaqa al-Iraq al-Arabi, and Al-Iraq Yajmaʿna ranked among the top spenders in Baghdad and the south under the “Unspecified sponsor” category — which alone accounted for over half of all digital election spending in Iraq. 

This network of public pages is estimated to have spent nearly 600,000 US Dollars in three months, on posts styled as “news” about meetings, visits, and service projects. In reality, they regularly promoted figures from the Coordination Framework or executive officials close to traditional Shi’a parties. 

Notably, these ads rarely mention elections or voting, instead revolving around buzzwords like stability, completed projects, and patriotism — reproducing the state’s official narrative. 

Cross-referencing the text, spending, and targeted areas shows these pages focus on Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, and Dhi Qar — provinces witnessing fierce competition between Coordination Framework blocs and independent or civic forces. 

The Bukhari Jamil page, which presents itself as cultural and social, published repetitive ads during early October featuring local leaders from the same bloc, invoking values like loyalty, truth, and authenticity — familiar themes in the tribal rhetoric used by the Coordination Framework. 

Linguistic analysis reveals that more than 70 percent of the ad content reflects positive mobilisation rhetoric directed at existing supporters, rather than persuasive messaging toward undecided voters — meaning these are internal mobilisation ads, not competitive election ads. 

Multaqa al-Bashaer, with a wide following in the south and Baghdad, uses subtler concealment tactics. It does not declare a party affiliation but produces video material identical in content and style to clips broadcast by channels close to the State of Law Coalition. Some clips are even reposted verbatim on accounts linked to that coalition. 

The page is verified, and Ad Library screenshots show that the ads are “Paid for by: Harakat al-Bashaer al-Shababiyya,” without mentioning any party entity — leaving its political identity unclassified. 

A similar pattern appeared in Kurdish-language pages, where local media outlets served as fronts for known Kurdish parties, especially in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, but without disclosing direct party funding. 

For instance, data from early October revealed recurring ad spending by pages such as Roj News and Zanko Media on posts featuring candidates from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Gorran (Change Movement). Each page spent between 4,000 and 9,000 US Dollars within a short period, none of them including sponsor details in the “Paid for by” field, despite promoting direct political content (lists, candidate numbers, or slogans). 

Thus, these media outlets act as soft fronts for electoral propaganda, financing partisan discourse under the guise of neutral news. 

At first glance, Iraq’s digital advertising market seems transparent — with visible pages of candidates, parties, and officials. Yet when the data from Meta’s files is reassembled, the largest player turns out to be the one with no declared affiliation. 

Over the past 90 days, unclassified pages spent around 600,000 US Dollars — roughly three times the combined spending of all parties and movements (109,000), and far exceeding individual candidates’ spending (173,000). 

For example, Multaqa al-Bashaer — which has shared pro-State of Law/Coordination Framework content since 2021 under a neutral “service” tone — spent roughly 37,000 US Dollars on targeted ads, focusing heavily on Baghdad and the south. 

Meanwhile, Kurdish pages posting overtly electoral content — led by Bukhari Jamil — spent about 18,000 US Dollars in total during the period under review. These pages publish clear Kurdish-language material mentioning lists and party slogans but do not reference any party in their ad texts. 

Pages like Roj News, Zanko Media, and Erbil 24 were also categorised as “unidentified” sponsors. Though presenting themselves as local news outlets, they fund content aimed at Kurdish audiences in the Kurdistan Region. 

Geographically, Baghdad ranks first with around 282,000 US Dollars of total national spending over 90 days, followed by Nineveh (113,000), then Dhi Qar, Basra, and Babil (between 58,000–62,000 each). 

Narratives shift across regions: in Baghdad, the message highlights capacity, authority, and achievement; in the south, social and religious proximity; and in the north, direct electoral appeals in local language and identity. 

Nearly two-thirds of the spending flows through unclassified channels, while platform and oversight transparency are nearly absent. 

The monitored data represents the first wave before the campaign’s peak. Spending and messaging are likely to expand significantly in the coming weeks. As election day approaches, it will be crucial to track whether these “unidentified networks” will clarify their political alignments or continue operating in the shadows, shaping voter behaviour from behind the screen. 

Published in partnership with the Arabi Facts Hub.