In February 2025, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court issued an interim order suspending three laws passed by parliament using the “single-basket” mechanism: a legislative practice in which multiple measures are approved together as part of a single political agreement among Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs.
The order halted laws that had remained the subject of political dispute for years: an amendment to the Personal Status Law championed by Shia politicians, the General Amnesty Law long demanded by Sunni politicians, and a property law primarily affecting disputed real estate claimed by Kurds in Kirkuk.
The ruling followed a legal challenge brought by a group of MPs, specifically, Shia MPs contesting the Amnesty Law. As with their passage in a single basket, the court’s interim order suspended all three laws collectively, pending a ruling on their constitutionality.
While Sunni and Kurdish forces protested the Federal Court’s decision, the Supreme Judicial Council intervened and formally challenged the ruling, an episode that was neither unprecedented nor the first point of tension between the two judicial institutions.
Following a political and institutional standoff, the court reversed the suspension and the state proceeded with implementation.
Rather than remaining an external arbiter, the judiciary has been drawn into managing political conflict itself.
Anatomy of the Judiciary
Iraq’s judiciary is composed of four bodies: the civil judiciary, overseen by the Supreme Judicial Council; the Federal Supreme Court, which exercises constitutional jurisdiction; and the administrative and military courts.
The Supreme Judicial Council is the judiciary’s highest administrative authority. Headquartered in Baghdad, its president holds a constitutional rank equivalent to that of the President of the Republic, the Speaker of Parliament, and the Prime Minister. The president of the Council also serves as president of the Court of Cassation.
The Court of Cassation has existed since the establishment of the Iraqi judiciary. It is considered the country’s highest judicial authority. Based in Baghdad, it currently consists of a president and 26 judges. The court reviews rulings issued by criminal, civil, and family courts across Iraq, adjudicates appeals within the jurisdiction of the ordinary judiciary, and exercises authority nationwide.
The Supreme Judicial Council itself, however, is a post-2003 institution. It was established following the US-led invasion. Under Law No. 45 of 2017, the Council is responsible for administering judicial bodies and nominating the president and judges of the Court of Cassation. The Iraqi constitution affirms the independence of the judiciary in Article 87 and the independence of judges in Article 88.
The Federal Supreme Court was also established after 2003. Based in Baghdad, it consists of a president and eight judges. Its mandate is limited to constitutional matters, and it operates with administrative and financial independence from the Supreme Judicial Council, in accordance with Article 92 of the constitution. Article 92 requires the enactment of a dedicated law governing the court by a two-thirds majority in parliament, which has yet to be passed.
Article 93 defines the court’s competencies, including reviewing the constitutionality of laws, interpreting constitutional provisions, adjudicating disputes arising from the application of federal legislation, resolving disputes between the federal government and regional or provincial authorities, ratifying election results, and settling conflicts related to jurisdiction between federal and regional judicial bodies. Article 94 stipulates that the court’s decisions are final and binding on all authorities.
Entering the Political Sphere
Following 2003, the judiciary was reorganised through the establishment of the Supreme Judicial Council under Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 35, on the basis of judicial independence and the separation of powers.
A significant institutional shift occurred in March 2004 with the promulgation of the Transitional Administrative Law, which established the Federal Supreme Court as Iraq’s constitutional court. Articles 44 and 45 of the Transitional Administrative Law stipulated that the court’s president would also serve as president of the Supreme Judicial Council.
In 2005, Law No. 35 established the Federal Supreme Court, with Judge Medhat Al-Mahmoud assuming leadership of both institutions, an arrangement that remained in place until structural changes in 2017 and 2020.
The core change concerned constitutional oversight. Prior to 2003, this function had been exercised by the state’s Shura Council, which Mahmoud himself had headed during the Baath era. The Federal Supreme Court, by contrast, conducts ex post constitutional review, intervening in response to legal challenges brought against legislation or political practices.
What was once a judiciary tasked with constitutional arbitration has increasingly become a decisive actor in Iraq’s political struggles.
Medhat Al-Mahmoud
Medhat Al-Mahmoud was born in Baghdad in 1933. He graduated at the top of his class from the College of Law in 1958–59, served as a reserve officer in the Iraqi army, and held a series of judicial positions from 1960 onward.
Before the 2003 invasion, he served as head of the Shura Council. He was appointed Minister of Justice in June 2003, and later became deputy president of the Court of Cassation, then president of the Federal Court of Cassation, and on 30 March 2005 was appointed president of the Federal Supreme Court, a position he held for 15 years while also chairing the Supreme Judicial Council.
Over the years, Al-Mahmoud faced accusations from political actors of favouring former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki, including claims that judicial powers were used selectively against political rivals or that corruption cases were delayed. Al-Mahmoud consistently rejected these allegations.
For much of his tenure, Al-Mahmoud maintained that judicial intervention in political matters was limited to what he viewed as necessary to preserve institutional stability. He did not present himself as a political actor and repeatedly emphasised the need to insulate judges from political pressure. However, this changed in 2010, when the Federal Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional provision defining the “largest parliamentary bloc” entitled to form a government.
In the 2010 parliamentary elections, former PM Iyad Allawi’s list won the largest number of seats, but the court ruled that the “largest bloc” referred to the coalition formed at parliament’s first session, rather than the list receiving the most votes. The ruling reshaped the government-formation process and enabled Al-Maliki to secure a second term.
A similar interpretation, applied more than a decade later, prevented the Sadrist movement from forming a government following the 2021 elections.
In 2013, the Accountability and Justice Commission ruled to remove Al-Mahmoud after “strong evidence” supplied by parliament confirmed his Baath Party affiliation, according to statements by MPs. The decision was not implemented, parliament failed to dismiss him, and the judiciary later reversed a move to appoint Judge Hassan Ibrahim Al-Humairi as his replacement.
Four years later, in 2017, parliament voted to appoint Faiq Zaidan as president of the Court of Cassation, and, by extension, president of the Supreme Judicial Council following the passage of the Supreme Judicial Council Law that year. The legislation removed the Council from Medhat Al-Mahmoud’s authority, leaving him to head only the Federal Supreme Court until 2020.
Faiq Zaidan
Born in 1967, Judge Faiq Zaidan was widely regarded as Al-Mahmoud’s protege. Mahmoud oversaw his rapid promotion, citing professional competence, but Zaidan’s ascent also reflected a broader institutional calculation. His appointment came at a moment of transition: Iraq was emerging from the war against ISIS, Iran-backed armed factions were moving to the forefront of political life, and Al-Mahmoud himself was facing public protests accusing him of political interference, protecting corruption, and criticism of the concentration of judicial authority in a single figure. Calls intensified for separating the leadership of the Supreme Judicial Council from the Federal Supreme Court.
Against this backdrop, Al-Mahmoud opted to remain at the Federal Supreme Court and position a successor within the Council.
Zaidan was first appointed to the Court of Cassation and then elevated to its presidency, automatically assuming the presidency of the Supreme Judicial Council under the newly enacted law.
Faiq Zaidan previously served on the Central Criminal Investigative Court established after 2003. He advanced rapidly within the judiciary, attaining first-class judicial status in 2011 after joining the Court of Cassation nine months later, an exceptional advancement in the history of Iraq’s judiciary. At the time of his appointment, Zaidan had not yet completed 13 years of judicial service.
Following his appointment, Zaidan entered into political disputes that marked a departure from the judiciary’s previous position. His first major confrontation came with then-prime minister Haider Al-Abadi over the handling of the 2018 election results. Tensions resurfaced during the October 2019 protest movement, with Zaidan remaining in office while Abadi exited the political scene, highlighting a contrast with the more insulated role the judiciary had played under Al-Mahmoud.
By this stage, informal understandings that had regulated relations between the judiciary and political actors had eroded. It appeared that Al-Mahmoud’s “gentlemen’s agreement” under which politics proceeded without judicial entanglement was no longer viable amid the growing influence of armed factions and their capacity to shape political outcomes. His subsequent retirement consolidated Zaidan’s authority over the judiciary.
In 2019, Shia parliamentary blocs introduced proposed amendments to Article 6 (Third) of Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005, setting a mandatory retirement age of 63 for Federal Court judges. The move was widely interpreted at the time as targeting Al-Mahmoud, who was approaching 80. Parliament then summoned the president and judges of the Federal Supreme Court, despite lacking constitutional oversight over the judiciary.
In response, Al-Mahmoud and the Federal Supreme Court issued a counter-ruling in May 2019, declaring Article 3 of the court’s law unconstitutional, which granted the Supreme Judicial Council authority to nominate Federal Court judges. The court ruled that the constitution did not confer such powers on the Council (Decision No. 38/2019).
Parliament escalated the dispute by formally consulting the Supreme Judicial Council, which endorsed the legislative push, supported unifying the retirement age across judicial bodies, and affirmed the Council’s authority to nominate Federal Court judges.
The standoff concluded on 18 March 2021, when parliament voted to amend Law No. 30 of 2005. The amendments transferred nomination powers to the Supreme Judicial Council and unified judicial age limits, effectively ending Mahmoud’s tenure and appointing Jassim Aboud Al-Umairi as president of the Federal Supreme Court. Kurdish parties and minority blocs boycotted the vote, objecting to both the court’s new composition and its internal decision-making procedures.
The amendment, enacted as Law No. 25 of 2021, passed with a simple majority of 204 MPs. From a constitutional standpoint, the vote fell short of the two-thirds majority required under Article 92 of the constitution and Federal Supreme Court Decision No. 107 of 2012 for legislation governing the court.
Even before this outcome, the judiciary had become more visibly engaged in political processes. In 2018, Zaidan intervened in the electoral process by appointing judges close to him to oversee the Independent High Electoral Commission, including Jassim Al-Umairi, who would later head the Federal Supreme Court. The judiciary declared the election results valid amid objections from other political actors. After Al-Mahmoud’s removal, further rulings and positions deepened the judiciary’s involvement in contentious political questions.
Zaidan has faced accusations of prior Baath Party affiliation and of proximity to Iran and Iraqi political forces aligned with Tehran. These claims have been linked to his publicly acknowledged relationship with Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the former deputy head of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, and with Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, both killed in a US airstrike near Baghdad airport in early 2020. In a televised interview in 2021, Zaidan described Al-Muhandis as “the brother my mother never gave birth to,” and later stated at a memorial event that Al-Muhandis and Hadi Al-Amiri, acting on Soleimani’s advice, had “protected the judiciary from popular protests that surrounded the Supreme Judicial Council building.”
Activists have criticised Zaidan for declining to bring charges against senior officials over killings during the October 2019 protests. In a statement issued in 2021, the Supreme Judicial Council maintained that no judicial rulings could be issued without sufficient evidence, in response to the deaths and injuries of protesters.
Unprecedented Political Friction
During Medhat Al-Mahmoud’s long tenure, the judiciary largely avoided direct political confrontation. His approach rested on the assumption that political disputes would pass and that institutional distance should be preserved. That balance began to erode toward the end of his tenure.
Through key rulings and institutional interventions, the courts have shaped government formation, blocked political alliances, and altered the balance of power.
In late 2019, former prime minister Haider Al-Abadi publicly criticised the judiciary in a post on X (then Twitter), questioning judicial interference in a cartoon. He also expressed remarks on judicial rulings based on presumed intent rather than evidence in response to a statement by the Supreme Judicial Council that dismissed Al-Abadi’s political ambitions as “illusory,” marking one of the first direct public exchanges between the judiciary and a senior political figure since 2003.
In subsequent statements, Al-Abadi accused unnamed actors of exploiting the judiciary to settle political scores, alleging a broader pattern that included violence against activists and protesters, enforced disappearances, and intimidation. He called on the head of the judiciary to safeguard judicial independence and avoid positioning the courts against the public.
Al-Abadi had previously contested the integrity of the 2018 elections that ended his rule, and clashed with judicial rulings concerning the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). In one prominent case, the judiciary reinstated Faleh Al-Fayyadh as head of the PMF five months after Al-Abadi had dismissed him for alleged political activity. The court ruled that Al-Abadi’s decision had been taken after elections, when his government was operating in a caretaker capacity.
Explicit Political Visibility
Following Faiq Zaidan’s appointment, his public profile and perceived political positioning became more pronounced. In media interviews, Zaidan stated that he had declined the post of prime minister on three occasions, citing his commitment to rebuilding the judiciary. This explanation was echoed by other politicians, who framed his refusal as a choice to prioritise institutional reform.
In 2024, members of the US Congress issued a detailed report calling on the US administration to review whether Zaidan met the criteria for potential sanctions. That same year, Fox News reported that planned meetings with Zaidan in Washington were cancelled during a scheduled visit. The reports linked the decision to his role in issuing an arrest warrant against Donald Trump in connection with the killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani.
According to leaked US policy assessments, Zaidan has been viewed as a figure aligned with efforts to advance Iranian interests and to facilitate the political influence of Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq.
Jassim Al-Umairi
Following the formation of Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani’s government in 2022 and the withdrawal of Muqtada Al-Sadr’s bloc from parliament, political forces aligned under the Coordination Framework gained parliamentary dominance. During this period, Jassim Al-Umairi assumed the presidency of the Federal Supreme Court.
Since then, the court has ruled on a series of cases brought by actors affiliated with those forces, including a challenge that led to the annulment of the 2012 Iraq–Kuwait maritime agreement on Khor Abdullah.
In this context, the question of who has benefited from Federal Supreme Court rulings in recent years has become a recurring subject of political debate. Many political actors and observers point to forces aligned with the Coordination Framework—namely Shia parties allied with Iran—as the primary beneficiaries of a series of consequential decisions.
These rulings have, in turn, fuelled accusations directed at both the court and its leadership. Among the most frequently cited examples is the Federal Court’s February 2022 decision against oil exports by the Kurdistan Region, which critics alleged was politically motivated and driven by figures associated with former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki. Similar claims resurfaced following the court’s November 2023 ruling that removed former speaker of parliament Mohammad Al-Halbousi from office, a decision widely interpreted by his allies as the outcome of pressure exerted by the same political forces.
In this narrative, responsibility has also been attributed by critics to Qais Al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, particularly after his public appearance alongside Federal Supreme Court president Jassim Al-Umairi at an event on 4 May 2024, an image that further reinforced perceptions of political proximity between the judiciary and armed political actors.
Consequential Rulings
In 2022, Iraq entered a major political crisis following the electoral victory of the Sadrist movement and its subsequent confrontation with a series of Federal Supreme Court rulings that set stringent conditions for government formation. Most significant was the court’s determination that the president of the republic must be elected by a two-thirds majority of the total number of MPs, and that the parliamentary session convened for that purpose must itself meet a two-thirds quorum.
The ruling effectively obstructed Muqtada Al-Sadr’s attempt to form a government based on a simple parliamentary majority. It also deepened divisions within the so-called “tripartite alliance,” which brought together the Sadrist movement, Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani, and then-speaker of parliament Mohammad Al-Halbousi. For the first time in Iraq’s post-2003 political experience, the decision gave rise to what became known as the “blocking third,” borrowing terminology from Lebanon, and delayed government formation for nearly a year.
The impasse ended only after violent confrontations, including armed clashes following the storming of the Green Zone by Sadrist supporters in February 2022 and culminated in Al-Sadr’s announcement of his withdrawal from politics and the resignation of his bloc from parliament.
That same month, the Federal Supreme Court rejected the candidacy of Hoshyar Zebari for the presidency, citing pending legal cases related to alleged administrative and financial corruption during his tenure as finance minister. Zebari responded by invoking a phrase previously used by former prime minister Haider Al-Abadi: “Where can a grain of wheat complain if the judge is a chicken?”
Observers noted parallels with the court’s 2010 interpretation of the “largest parliamentary bloc,” which had enabled Nouri Al-Maliki to form a government despite Iyad Allawi’s electoral lead. In 2022, however, the interpretation operated to the advantage of forces opposing the Sadrist-led alliance.
The court’s interventions extended further. In February 2022, it ruled unconstitutional the Kurdistan Regional Government’s 2007 oil and gas law and required the region to hand over oil revenues to the federal government. Two years later, the court issued additional rulings affecting the Kurdistan Region: one dividing it into four electoral districts, and another restricting the payment of public-sector salaries to federal government banks outside the region. Both decisions prompted concern among Kurdish authorities and parties over a perceived erosion of the region’s autonomy.
In 2024, the court ordered a reduction in the number of seats in the Kurdistan Parliament from 111 to 100, as set out in the amended 1992 election law. It also ruled that Iraq’s federal electoral commission, rather than the Kurdistan Region’s own electoral body, would administer elections in the region.
Managing Escalation
The most recent episode, the three laws passed as a single package, triggered renewed public debate. Amendments to the Personal Status Law drew criticism from local and international rights organisations for permitting child marriage. The General Amnesty Law revived public memories of mass violence and raised fears of a resurgence of armed groups. In Kirkuk, Arab and Turkmen groups objected to the restitution of property to Kurdish claimants, arguing that compensation had already been paid.
These developments coincided with major regional and international shifts, including the collapse of the Assad regime, the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, the weakening of Iran’s regional axis, and renewed discussion of potential US sanctions affecting Iraq.
The episode reinforced a broader perception that judicial decision-making has become deeply intertwined with Iraq’s political process. What had once been limited, conditional intervention has evolved into sustained engagement with core political disputes.
Over time, rulings by the Federal Supreme Court and actions by the Supreme Judicial Council have disproportionately affected certain political actors, reinforcing accusations that the judiciary has aligned itself, intentionally or not, with dominant Shia political forces facing public discontent over broader governance failures.
If Iraq is to pursue reform and restore confidence in its institutions, the path forward requires genuine judicial independence. That process begins with legislating a comprehensive framework for the Federal Supreme Court, modernising the legal system, and reinforcing a clear separation between judicial authority and political power.
Published in partnership with the Iraqi Network for Investigative Journalism (NIRIJ). Adapted by Jummar from Arabic, available here.
