What are the concerns in Iraq regarding Donald Trump's return to the White House? What discussions and warnings about this are taking place behind the scenes in Iraqi politics? Will damaging the Iraqi economy and security be part of the agenda for the incoming American president?

Columns of smoke have been rising from rural areas north of Baghdad for the past two months, suggesting military movements aimed at misleading drones that might target weapon depots and headquarters of Iraqi armed factions and infrastructure. Meanwhile, the debate in Iraqi political corridors has intensified over what Donald Trump’s return to the White House means. 

Trump’s second victory in the U.S. presidency was not welcome news in the corridors of the Coordination Framework, the ruling Shiite political coalition in Iraq, despite an official welcome from the Iraqi government. 

Shiite apprehension 

According to a political source close to the Coordination Framework, “Trump’s victory has caused widespread concern among Shiite forces, who had hoped for the victory of the Democratic Party candidate, Kamala Harris.” Yet the current approach within the Framework, particularly from the faction aligned with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and close allies such as Ammar Al-Hakim and Haider Al-Abadi, is to take a pragmatic engagement with Trump. 

Despite what was a quick call by Al-Sudani with Trump to congratulate him on his victory, the call provoked resistance factions, who viewed this as a sign that the government might give in to pressure from the new U.S. administration. 

A political source close to the government told Jummar, “Al-Sudani is attempting to establish a practical relationship with Trump, but he understands that this could draw criticism from Shiite factions who see Trump’s return as a direct threat to their interests.” 

Trump’s first term and the fear of a second 

For context, the four years of Trump’s first term, from January 20, 2017, to January 20, 2021, were far from ordinary for Iraq. 

Relations between Washington and Baghdad were initially strained, especially following Trump’s surprise visit to Ain Al-Asad Airbase in Anbar in December 2018 without prior coordination with Iraqi officials. This move sparked a wave of criticism in Iraq and was seen as a disregard for the country’s authority. 

A year after this incident, the United States conducted an airstrike in Al-Qaim region near the Syrian border, targeting Iraqi factions and resulting in around 25 casualties, both killed and injured. 

Tensions with these factions escalated and ended with an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad by supporters of armed groups on the final day of 2019. 

The assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, in January 2020, was one of the most sensitive moments in the relationship between Iraq and the United States. 

This attack led the Iraqi parliament to vote on a resolution demanding the retreat of U.S. forces from the country. It also marked the beginning of an era characterised by drone strikes and Katyusha rockets targeting numerous sites, including, for the first time since 2003, one on the residence of former Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. 

The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council concluded Iraq’s legal dealings with Trump by issuing an arrest warrant against him under Iraqi penal law. Faiq Zidan, the head of the council, stated that “the judiciary will not hesitate to take legal action against anyone proven to have participated in the assassination of Al-Nasr leaders,” referring to Al-Muhandis and Soleimani. 

In addition to political and security pressures, Iraq has faced severe crises due to plummeting oil prices. The situation worsened under Trump’s policies, which encouraged U.S. oil production and contributed to a global decline in oil prices. 

Resistance and confrontation 

When Trump’s victory was announced, Iraqi armed factions under the Popular Mobilization Forces began reorganising their ranks. 

In November, a group of journalists returning from Kurdistan to Baghdad reported seeing piles of car tyres and fires near Al-Azim area in Diyala. When they asked a checkpoint about a kilometre away about the cause of the fires, they were told: “None of your business!” 

A fighter stationed near Al-Azim mentioned that “orders to burn tyres are issued occasionally, depending on the wind direction”. He added, “Usually, the fires are lit when the winds blow southward,” but admitted, “I’m not sure why—perhaps to cover up the withdrawal of military units or out of fear of drones”. 

Another fighter in Khanaqin, Diyala, spoke of strict instructions banning the use of smartphones, fearing “a breach similar to the Pager attacks in Lebanon” which led to the deaths of Hezbollah leaders and members. 

There are growing signs of tactical withdrawals from certain military bases, the evacuation of some weapons depots, and the relocation of some commanders to Iran. This is accompanied by increasing concerns about the potential U.S.-Israeli targeting of approximately 30 sites in Iraq. 

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar accused Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Ansar Allah Al-Awfia, and Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada of attacking Israel, according to a letter he addressed to the UN Security Council. 

Sa’ar claimed that these factions are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, accusing the Iraqi military organisation of receiving support from the Iraqi government and directives from Iran. 

Mohammed Na’naa, a political commentator who once faced imprisonment for criticising the Sudani government, believes that “Trump’s return means U.S. policy will become more aggressive toward Iran and its allied factions.” 

The escalating threats prompted Ali Al-Sistani, the highest Shiite religious authority in Iraq, to call for limiting arms to the state and preventing foreign interference, a rare statement addressing the intense situation in the region. 

Na’naa added, “The factions appear willing to step back in the face of the upcoming wave and saw an opportunity in Sistani’s latest statement”. 

Unlimited support for Israel 

Trump’s return means increased U.S. support for Israel, who have accused Iraqi factions of repeated rocket attacks. This could pave the way for broader Popular Mobilization Forces infrastructure targeting Israel, including weapons depots and command centres. 

Ahmed Al-Yasiri, an Iraqi researcher based in Australia, said, “Trump’s policy is deal-oriented, but he is closer to Israel than any other Republican president”. 

On the other hand, Abu Mithaq Al-Masari, a political analyst close to the Coordination Framework, called for “bending before strong storms” implying the need for political de-escalation and avoiding tension with the new U.S. administration. 

A source in the Coordination Framework said, “There might be sacrifices involving the Popular Mobilization Forces” pointing out that the Trump administration had previously sought to integrate this military body, composed of armed factions, into the security ministries, specifically the Ministries of Defense and Interior. 

Economic sanctions 

Trump favours economic policies to boost domestic U.S. production, particularly in the oil sector. If his administration aggressively resumes implementing these policies, it could lead to a drop in global oil prices, placing Iraq’s economy—almost entirely dependent on oil revenues—in a dangerous position. Additionally, Washington might reimpose restrictions on Iraqi financial transfers to Iran, which will worsen Iraq’s existing economic and electricity crises. 

“Trump’s strict dollar policies will tighten oversight on Iraqi banks, potentially leading to economic paralysis.” Said Nabil Al-Marsoumi, an economics professor at the University of Basra. 

Al-Marsoumi noted that Iraq’s trade with Iran, valued at 12 billion U.S. Dollars, and tourism spend in Iran, estimated at 3 billion U.S. Dollars, could become leverage points for Trump’s administration to achieve its political goals. 

Iraq’s reliance on oil revenues— 97 percent of its income—makes it highly vulnerable to market fluctuations. With Trump’s policy of expanding U.S. oil production, oil prices could decline further, negatively impacting Iraq’s already strained budget. 

In the heart of the storm 

Trump’s return to presidency places Iraq in a difficult situation. A country still dealing with the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion and subsequent conflicts now finds itself once again at the centre of a geopolitical storm that could reshape the entire region. 

In this context, Trump’s return is not merely a change in White House leadership but a new challenge for Iraq, which stands at a crossroads where internal challenges intertwine with external pressures. 

The Iraqi government and its constituent forces will need to carefully and cautiously manage their relationship with Trump and his hardline team, especially given that the new White House administration’s negative influence shows little hesitation in undermining sovereignty and economies. 

Abdul Jabbar Ahmed, a professor of political science, believes that Trump’s next four years in office may see an escalation against Iran and its allies in the region, including Iraqi factions. 

Yet Ahmed, who frequently participates in political debates on television, also suggested that Trump might be more rational during his second term.