This article traces how secular and civil discourse took shape in Iraq after 2003— when it rose to prominence, how it declined, and why it never turned into a decisive political force. This article traces the historical trajectory of this discourse from the Governing Council to the 2025 elections, from unexpected alliances to rapid fragmentation.

After the fall of the former regime following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, Iraqis found themselves exposed to various concepts, definitions and movements carrying new banners: democracy, secularism, a civil state, technocracy and political independence amongst others. These terms were not new to political discourse, but they were new to Iraqis as lived practice after years of the Ba’ath Party rule, which had previously banned political movements, parties and freedoms, and governed the country with an iron fist. 

The winds of these new labels swept over Iraqis, and they were not given the space and time needed for them to take root in their consciousness and thinking. The promise of these emerging discourses collided with the accumulation of failures resulting from the major challenges that Iraq faced all at once, and with the failure of its new leadership to manage and contain them. 

Another direct factor that distorted these terms was that the new political system post -2003 was established on the basis of a power-sharing system (known as muhasasa) rooted in quotas, consensus and sectarian affiliation. This system hindered the emergence of strong and influential civil and secular movements, while these terms were often misused or stripped of their meaning. 

The Turbulence After the Change 

The first process that contributed to distorting the concepts of secularism and civility, or independence and technocracy, began with the Iraqi Governing Council^(*).Figures who identified as secular, civil, independent, or technocratic were placed under the “Shia quota” or “Sunni quota.” Ahmad Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, and Ayad Allawi, head of the Iraqi National Accord, although both secular in their political and intellectual orientation, were classified as Arab Shia; and a figure like Hamid Majid Mousa, head of the Iraqi Communist Party, was counted among the Arab Shia. Figures like Adnan Al-Pachachi and Naseer Al-Jaderji were defined as Arab Sunni despite their civil and secular upbringing. The lure of power and desire to participate in a new phase of Iraq’s history led them to accept that trade-off with their convictions. We would later see how most of these figures retreated, overshadowed by the growing ascent of sectarian and religious political actors and parties. 

In the first post-2003 Iraqi cabinet led by Ayad Allawi, a handful of ministers were seen as technocrats or independents with civil and secular leaning despite partisan ties, such as former Defense Minister Hazem Al-Shaalan, Electricity Minister Ayham Al-Samarrai, and Culture Minister Mufid Al-Jazaeri, a member of the Communist Party. As for the first parliamentary elections, from which the Iraqi National Assembly emerged, the vast majority of the 275 seats went to coalitions and parties organized along sectarian or ethnic lines. Meanwhile, Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya List, a mixed but largely secular-leaning slate, secured only 40 seats, while the Communist Party won just two. By Iraqi standards, these were the blocs most commonly associated with what was presumed to be  “secular,” “civil,” “independent,” or “technocratic”.  

As for the transitional Iraqi government headed by Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, formed on the basis of the National Assembly election results, it included actors deemed as civil and secular, as well as independent and technocratic: Finance Minister Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi; State Minister for Women’s Affairs Azhar Al-Shaikhli, and Minister of Migration and the Displaced Suhaila Abdul Jaafar.These are some examples of figures who were non-partisan at the time, yet were classified by sect. 

If we look at the figures of the government formed by Nouri al-Maliki in 2006, we find names such as former Defense Minister Abdulqader Al-Obaidi and Interior Minister Jawad Al-Bolani, who was appointed as an independent after leaving Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress; as well as Raed Fahmi, who served as Minister of Culture and is now the secretary of the Communist Party. 

There is often a conflation between political affiliation and expertise (technocracy). Sect-based political parties routinely promoted ministerial nominees from within their own ranks, citing expertise in their fields. In practice, even “independent” technocrats required the backing of the dominant political parties in order to obtain a ministerial post; without such partisan endorsement, they were unlikely to assume office at all. 

In Iraq, technocracy often masks political loyalty- no minister rises without a party’s backing.  

The parliamentary elections held in 2010 were led by Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya list, which came in first with 91 seats. It brought together a mix of Iraqi parties and currents with diverse orientations, including several members who identified with notions of “civility” and “secularism.” Yet it ultimately dissolved. Internally, it struggled with a lack of cohesion. In addition, a Federal Supreme Court ruling interpreted the “largest bloc” (Article 76/1) as the one formed after the elections rather than the winner based on election results, effectively blocking Iraqiyya’s path to forming a government. Externally, Iranian reservations and veto played an important role in preventing it from forming the government. Together, these factors converged to bring about Iraqiyya’s failure and dealt a major blow to the political future of civil and secular forces in Iraq. 

Perhaps the map of civil and secular political forces became somewhat clearer in the 2014 elections in which Allawi’s Iraqiyya bloc won 21 seats, and the Civil Democratic Alliance secured three. These elections marked a noticeable decline in Iraqiyya’s representation, as well as a continued fragility in the experiences of civil, secular and independent forces, limiting their political influence. Their presence remained largely symbolic: a tool that the political system turns to in times of crises and rising popular discontent.  

Haider Al-Abadi’s 2014 government initially formed another quota-share cabinet; later, some adjustments were made under the pressure of Sadrist and popular protests. These changes popularised the word “technocrat,” but neither the term nor the subsequent reshuffles altered the fundamentals of the sectarian quota system that continued to define Iraq’s political landscape. 

Breaking the Ice Between Islamist and Civil Forces 

The political preparations for the 2018 elections witnessed an unexpected breakthrough between civil and Islamist forces: Sa’iroun Alliance, which brought together the Sadrist current led by Muqtada al-Sadr, the Iraqi Communist Party, and other secular and civil forces. The declared aim of the Alliance was to break from apportionment and political sectarianism that had governed the Iraqi political system after the occupation and thaw the mutual hostility between Islamists and secularists.  

The Sa’iroun Alliance did indeed win the elections, coming first with 54 seats. Yet, it too failed to form a government and ultimately had to accept the consensus candidate Adel Abdul Mahdi to form the new Iraqi government. This alliance soon unraveled under the weight of profound ideological and political contradictions between the Islamist and secular camps which could not be bridged by an agreement on “national principles.” This was accelerated by the October 2019 protests, especially after the Sadrist current withdrew its support from the protest squares, moving toward accommodation with political rivals. Added to this was Al-Sadr’s penchant to monopolise decision-making without referring back to his allies such as the Communist Party.  

The Tishreen Protests Redefine the Game: “Independents” to the Fore 

Abdul-Mahdi’s government lacked independent technocratic or secular figures, with the notable exception of former Culture Minister Abdul-Amir al-Hamdani, a specialist in archaeology and civilizations, whose appointment aligned with interests of the armed group Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq. 

Abdul-Mahdi’s government did not last long. One year after its formation, mass protests erupted on 1 October 2019 (known as Tishreen). The government’s crackdown on protests and the killing of demonstrators escalated the crisis. Protesters’ demands soon reached the point of calling for the overthrow of the regime, and the country entered a state of paralysis. The protest forces demanded Abdul-Mahdi’s resignation and accountability, reform of the political system, the formation of a caretaker cabinet to prepare for early elections, and a new electoral law with multi-member districts. As the protests and sit-ins in Baghdad and the central and southern provinces escalated, and after the Supreme Religious Authority in Najaf demanded the government’s resignation, Abdul Mahdi announced that he would step down. The Iraqi parliament accepted his resignation, after which he addressed former President Barham Salih to task another figure with forming a new government. 

To absorb public anger and the momentum of the protests, Iraq’s political system ultimately opted for Mustafa Al-Kadhimi to form what can be described as a transitional government, tasked with preparing the country for early parliamentary elections. His appointment came after a seven-month stalemate following Adel Abdul Mahdi’s resignation, during which the system failed to coalesce around nominees. Political consensus settled on Al-Kadhimi, former head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, who was perceived to be politically independent, without partisan or sectarian affiliation, and aligned with civil, secular, or liberal currents.  

The Tishreen movement, however, believed the authorities had not met its core aspirations. Still, Al-Kadhimi attempted to assemble a cabinet that struck a balance between street pressure and the expectations of dominant political blocs. Several ministers were presented as independents or technocrats — including the defense and interior ministers; Culture Minister Hassan Nazim; Youth and Sports Minister Adnan Dirjal; Finance Minister Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi; Higher Education Minister Nabil Kazem Abbas; and Planning Minister Manhal Aziz Abdul-Rahman. As a result, Kadhimi’s cabinet leaned toward a technocratic and independent profile, with some describing its tone as civil or even secular. 

It appears that key political actors supported Kadhimi’s government in this form not out of conviction in its independence, civility, or secularism, but as a tactical move to calm the street. The strategy that followed aimed to dismantle the protest movement turning to carrots and sticks, and to persuade a broad set of protest leaders that their only viable path forward was participation in elections, without probing other democratic mechanisms or confronting the corruption and quota-based structure of the system. 

When the Tishreen uprising eventually subsided, many of its participants shifted toward formal political engagement by forming parties and contesting the early parliamentary elections of 2021. Yet Tishreen’s forces were divided.Some joined the race. Others boycottedA third withdrew from the political sphere entirely. 

Despite these contradictions, the 2021 elections marked a notable shift. The Coordination Framework Forces suffered losses in votes and seats, while civil and protest-rooted forces made visible gains. Among them was the Imtidad Movement, led by Member of Parliament (MP) Alaa al-Rikabi — a leading figure of the Tishreen protests in Dhi Qar — alongside other independent protest representatives such as MP Sajad Salim and independent MP Muhammad Anouz, an academic specializing in international law. Imtidad won nine seats, rising to 15 after the withdrawal of the Sadrist bloc. 

Additionally, 43 independent MPs won seats out of 789 candidates, one of the distinct outcomes of the new electoral law. Yet “independent” was not a uniform category. Some actors came from tribal backgrounds, like Muhayman Al-Hamdani; others were former MPs or officials; and some ran as independents with backing from dominant political blocs, with an understanding they would join those blocs after the elections — including Waad Al-Qaddo, Muhammad Al-Muhammadi, and Asmaa Al-Ani. For several blocs, supporting “independent” candidates was a way to capture swing voters disillusioned with traditional parties. 

Among civil alliances, Imtidad and several other groups — including Nazil Akhudh Haqqi, the FAO–Zakho Organization, and the October National Organization, chose to compete. Other Tishreen-aligned movements boycotted, citing unsuitable conditions, including: Al-Bayt Al-Watani, the 25 October Movement, Al-Bayt Al-Iraqi, the Organization of Opposition Forces, and the People’s Oversight Gathering. 

The 2023 provincial council elections, held under the Sainte-Laguë system with each province treated as a single electoral district, signaled a rollback of the reforms that the Tishreen movement demanded. Civil forces declined relative to their 2021 performance. Imtidad, weakened by fragmentation and parliamentary failure, chose not to participate, sensing the disappointment of their voter base. 

During this period, several civil and Tishreen-aligned parties formed the Qiyam (Values) Civil Alliance — comprising the Iraqi Communist Party, the Social Democratic Current, Al-Bayt Al-Watani, Nazil Akhudh Haqqi, the National Civil Movement, and others born from anti-establishment protests. Led by MP Sajad Salim alongside Dr. Ali al-Rifai, the coalition won six seats across the provinces in which it ran, a modest outcome reflecting public frustration with civil and Tishreen movements. 

Where Do Iraq’s Secular, Civil, Independent, and Technocratic Forces Stand Today? 

After tracing the trajectory of these currents since 2003, it has become clear that these concepts themselves, and those who adopt them, remain fragile and have repeatedly failed to crystallize into sustainable political forces in Iraq. This stems partly from internal shortcomings and partly from the broader political system. 

Internal Factors 

1. No genuine commitment to these principles. Many actors adopt such labels for political advantage or in response to particular moments, most notably during the Tishreen uprising. 

2. Certain public figures have contributed to crises within the secular and civil camp and distorted its image. Personalities such as Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali, along with other civil activists inexperienced political work, entered public disputes in the media with other forces, reinforcing negative perceptions of these movements. 

3. Civil movements often replicated the practices of Islamist, religious, and nationalist parties — centralized authority, leadership monopoly over decision-making, and the absence of internal democratic mechanisms. 

4. Intra-rivalries and internal disputes over leadership and prominence, competition among civil and secular figures, independents, and technocrats, combined with the lack of unified positions on key political issues, fragmented their influence. 

5. Accepting marginal roles within Iraq’s quota and power-sharing equation, a position presumed to be at odds with the principles of secularism and civility common in Iraqi norms. 

6. The inability of these movements to break out of narrow elite constituencies. Their inability to attract broader segments of the middle and poorer classes ultimately hindered their efforts to build broader public support. 

External Factors 

1. The apportionment system, corruption, and clientelism governing the political system, and the dominance of a limited stratum over policy making, pose structural obstacles to the emergence of independent, civil, secular, or technocratic actors. 

2. Iraq’s political and social environment, shaped by religious identity, continues to view civil and secular ideas with suspicion, often treating them as hostile to Islam depriving them of social base needed to become rooted political projects. Tribal, kinship, and patriarchal structures privilege loyalty over competence and independence, limiting the prospects for the success of a technocracy with politically independent forces. 

3. Non-Islamist forces have had to soften or bend their commitments, seeking approaches that would not provoke societal sensitivities:  The term “civil” as a diluted alternative to “secular,” and for rhetoric that appears more in line with religion, sect, and ritual. 

Given these pressures, secular, civil, independent, and technocratic forces now stand at a critical juncture. After years of experimentation, and the brief flourishing after Tishreen, their representatives have struggled to articulate a sustainable path forward. 

The 11 November 2025 elections have arrived amid a marked retreat. The failure of the independents’ experience in the 2021 parliament has damaged the very concept of “political independence” or “independents.”  Many independent MPs ultimately gravitated toward powerful Sunni and Shia parties. Even those elected under civil banners, such as female MP Noor Nafi and MP Diaa al-Hindi, who later resigned from Imtidad citing violations of Tishreen’s principles, are now candidates on the Reconstruction and Development list, led by Prime Minister Mohammad Al-Sudani, a figure of the traditional political class Tishreen opposed, in addition to the presence of some key figures from armed groups. 

Meanwhile, the Nazil Akhudh Haqqi democratic movement, one of Tishreen’s outcomes; the Amarji Party, which promotes “conservative liberalism” while maintaining proximity to the ruling elite; and, the Professionals Party formed the tripartite Hulul (Solutions) Alliance, joining the Reconstruction and Development coalition. Other Imtidad members and independents dispersed into blocs such as State of Law, Azm, and others. 

On the other hand, a broad civil coalition, Al-Badil (The Alternative), led by Adnan al-Zurfi emerged. The coalition brought together the Communist Party, the Independence Party, al-Bayt al-Watani, the Iraqi Economy Alliance, the Kafa Movement, the Independents Alliance, and a range of civil and protest-aligned groups. It describes itself as a national, civil, independent reformist project committed to “rebuilding the state on the foundations of competence, integrity, and social justice.” Separately, the Civil Democratic Alliance led by Ali Al-Rifai, announced its participation under the banner “Civil State – Social Justice.” It includes forces such as the Social Democratic Current, the Muwatini National Initiative, and the Renewed Horizon Movement. This alliance maintains close ties with the civil protest movements and brings together a broad group of civil activists, independents, elites, and union representatives. Many of its leading figures took part in the Tishreen uprising. It represents a civil opposition to the political system that seeks to exert political influence through continuous participation in elections. 

Across these formations, the labels “civil” and “independent” appear repeatedly, often with ambiguity and without a coherent political vision. Many adopt these terms to signal distance from a “suspect” political class — while remaining deeply engaged in the political process. As political actors influence and are influenced, the notion of the “independent” has become clouded with suspicion, especially after its use as a vehicle for political advancement in 2021. The same applies to “secular,” “civil,” and “technocrat.” In Iraq, many assume that these labels grant them moral advantage over Islamist forces and that society will automatically support them. This is a profound misreading. These remain labels more than projects, one reason behind their recurrent failure. 

2025 Elections: The Final Wave 

Conflicting visions of the Iraqi political situation, lack of experience, repeated fragmentation, and the failure to produce a sustainable political model representing their base have all contributed to the continued setbacks of civil and secular forces, both old and new. Their inability to attract a broad segment of the “indifferent,” Iraqi public, which refrains from political participation, further weakened their foothold. 

In Iraq, “civility,” “secularism,” “independence,” and “technocracy” have remained fleeting political moments rather than enduring projects. They failed to embed themselves in Iraq’s political and social landscape as we have noted in several experiences. The constant reshuffling of alliances is its sustainable projects is maintaining continuity, not forming a new entity that is torn down as soon as the elections end. Thus, these movements remain electoral projects, not sustained political projects capable of planning for the future. 

Given all this, the prospects of these forces in the 2025 elections appear limited. They seem unlikely to maintain the gains of 2021. This failure traces back to their inability to transform previous opportunities into a rooted, durable political project. Calls for boycotting the vote, advanced by parties such as the National Line, have grown stronger, making a repeat of their 2021 breakthrough improbable and likely returning them to their pre-Tishreen position: a small parliamentary presence, unlikely to exceed 10 seats at best.  

This article is adapted from Arabic, available here